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A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE DEFENSE
OF INDIGENTS IN MISSOURI*
JULES B. GERARDt
INTRODUCTION
Last year the American Bar Foundation, in cooperation with the Ameri-
can Bar Association and other groups, launched a nationwide audit of the
defense of indigent persons accused of crime. Information was gathered
from every state. Within each state, questionnaires were mailed to most
judges, all prosecuting attorneys, and a sampling of defense lawyers, and
field surveys were conducted in several counties selected at random. One
or more reporters, usually native lawyers presumably familiar with the
state's administration of criminal law, interviewed the judge, the prosecut-
ing attorney, the magistrate, and, if there was one, the public defender, in
each survey county. They also prepared detailed analyses, called "docket
studies," of a random sampling of the criminal cases processed by the sur-
vey counties in 1962.' The end product should be the most comprehensive
compilation of data about the administration of criminal law yet attempted
in the United States.2
This article is a preliminary report on the data collected in Missouri. In
1960, the state had a population of 4,319,813. It is divided into 114 coun-
* Field work for this article was done jointly by the author and by Professor Duane
R. Nedrud, University of Missouri at Kansas City, as Reporters for Missouri on behalf
of the American Bar Foundation, which supervised the nationwide survey described in
the opening paragraph of the text. The survey was financed by the Ford Foundation,
the American Bar Association, and the American Bar Foundation. Professor Nedrud
offered helpful advice and criticism, but did not otherwise participate in the writing of
this article, and therefore should not be held accountable for its shortcomings.
A special debt of gratitude is owed to Lee Silverstein, Project Director for the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation, who supervised the field research and was helpful in interpreting
the results.
The conclusions drawn should not be attributed to either the American Bar Associa-
tion or the American Bar Foundation.
i Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Magistrates were interviewed, and docket studies were compiled, in all survey
counties in Missouri. In most other states, no magistrates were interviewed, and docket
studies were made only in some of the survey counties.
A distinction is usually made between "public" and "private" defenders on the basis
of their sources of funds, the former defined as financed entirely from tax revenues, the
latter as supported entirely by non-governmental contributions. A "mixed" defender is
supported by both. The text is meant to include all defender systems of whatever kind.
2. Results of the nationwide audit will be published in book form by the American
Bar Foundation.
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ties and the independent City of St. Louis. Institutions administering the
criminal law are alike in all of these political subdivisions except the City of
St. Louis. Each county has a prosecuting attorney who prosecutes all crimes,
felonies and misdemeanors, that occur within his jurisdiction. Each has at
least one magistrate before whom accused felons are brought for bail to be
set and for preliminary hearings. These magistrates have concurrent juris-
diction (with the circuit courts) over the trial of misdemeanors; they also
have inferior civil jurisdiction.
The City of St. Louis has two prosecutors instead of one, the Circuit At-
torney for felonies, the Prosecuting Attorney for misdemeanors. The crim-
inal jurisdiction of the magistrates is assigned in the City to the Court of
Criminal Correction, composed of two judges who have no civil jurisdiction
whatever.
The state has two public defender bureaus. One of venerable age, 26
years, is located in the City of St. Louis. The other, established January 1,
1963, is in St. Louis County. Both were created by local ordinance and
operate without financial help from the state.
Exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of felonies is vested in the circuit
courts. There are 43 circuits which vary in the number of judges assigned
and the number of counties covered. Most circuits have only one judge; the
largest has 18. Some circuits contain one county, some two; a few embrace
as many as five. Since decisions of individual judges and prosecutors can
have pronounced effects upon the administration of criminal law, the struc-
ture of the circuits results in a number of variables. In a multi-judge circuit
the handling of a particular problem, the determination of indigency, for
example, will change as judges are rotated through the "criminal divison."
But because no multi-judge circuit includes more than one county, decisions
of the prosecutor, such as how much information to reveal to the defense at-
torney, are likely to be consistent. On the other hand, however, in one-
judge, multi-county circuits the judge's decisions are likely to be consistent
throughout his circuit, but decisions made by prosecutors are likely to change
from one county to the next.
Field surveys were conducted in eight of Missouri's 115 counties.,3 Some
pertinent information about them is compiled in Table 1. They are diverse
3. Counties within a state were grouped into categories based upon the number of
criminal cases handled by their courts during 1962. Counties were selected for survey
at random, except that no two counties from the same judicial circuit were chosen. The
National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago advised the Bar Founda-
tion in making the selections so that reporters could not "load" the results by choosiig
counties they knew to be outstandingly good or bad.
St. Louis County was not included, but was added to the original sample because of
its importance in the state.
For convenience, the City of St. Louis is often called a "county" in this article.
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TABLE 1
COUNTIES SURVEYED
Number of 1960 Population Number of
counties in in 1000s Felony Number of of att'ys
judicial Judicial def'ts docket in private
County circuit County Circuit 1962 studiesa practiceb
Audrain 3 26 46 120o 50 15
City of
St. Louis 1 750 750 2,101 144 2,208
Howell 4 22 43 950 20 7
Jackson 1 623 623 1,380 80 2,120
Jasper 1 79 79 161 50 79
Miller 5 14 62 17 18 7
Putnam 4 7 37 14 12 2
St. Louis 1 703 703 311 48 628
a A few docket studies were discarded before final tabulations were made. This ac-
counts for some of the peculiar numbers, such as that for the City of St. Louis.
b These figures include prosecuting and assistant prosecuting attorneys, and magistrates
if they are lawyers. These office holders normally would not be appointed to represent
defendants. The figures are accurate as of the time of the survey (July-August 1963) but
may not reflect the situation that existed in 1962.
c The number of felony defendants in 1962 was determined by a count of court records
in all counties except Audrain and Howell. The figures for these counties were taken
from the annual report of the Judicial Conference of Missouri for the fiscal year ending
June 15, 1962.
TABLE 2
AGE OF DEFENDANTS
Under 60 and No Total
County 18 18-20 21-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over Data Studies
Audrain 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 44 50
City of St. Louis 12 25 25 28 25 14 10 4 1 144
Howell 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 20
Jackson 4 12 12 13 11 10 2 1 15 80
Jasper 3 2 4 1 3 1 0 0 36 50
Miller 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 13 18
Putnam 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 10 12
St. Louis 3 10 8 9 7 6 2 3 0 48
Totals 23 50 53 52 49 32 15 10 138 422
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TAzLz 3
SEX AND RACE OF DEFENDANTS
Sex Race
County Male Female No Data White Negro No Data
Audrain 50 0 0 12 2 36
City of St. Louis 133 10 1 60 83 1
Howell 20 0 0 20 0 0
Jackson 78 2 0 33 34 13
Jasper 41 9 0 12 0 38
Miller 17 1 0 18 0 0
Putnam I 1 0 1 11 0 1
St. Louis 46 2 0 34 14 0
396 24 2 200 133 89
TABLB 4
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED
County 0-4 5-8 9-12 More than 12 No Data
Audrain 0 1 4 0 45
City of St. Louis 1 15 9 1 118
Howell 0 0 0 0 20
Jackson 0 0 0 1 79
Jasper 0 3 8 0 39
Miller 0 1 1 0 16
Putnam 0 1 0 0 11
St. Louis 0 1 1 1 45
1 22 23 3 373
in many ways besides population and number of felony defendants. Most
geographical areas of the state are represented. Putnam is a small com-
munity devoted almost entirely to agriculture. Miller is also small and
agricultural, but it has a tourist industry. Howell County, which is larger
but still rural, has many tourists. Audrain is a wealthy county supported by
agriculture and light industry. Jasper County is a medium-sized com-
mercial center. St. Louis County is predominantly suburban, but a few
large industries are located there, and its commercial activity is growing.
Jackson County (Kansas City) and the City of St. Louis are, of course,
large commercial concentrations.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss3/3
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TABLE 5
OFFENSES CHARGED a
0.
County 0
Audrain 7 1 4 6 1 17 1 0 0 0
City of St. Louis 14 12 28 0 2 1 18 3 8 9
Howell 0 0 4 0 7 2 0 0 1 1
Jackson 11 6 24 1 0 7 7 2 14 1
Jasper 1 2 14 0 1 12 11 3 1 1
Miller 1 0 4 0 1 3 12 1 0 0
Putnam 2 0 2 5 0 2 0 1 0 0
St. Louis 4 0 16 1 0 6 6 1 1 0
40 21 96 13 12 50 55 11 25 12
a Offenses not listed were charged against the following numbers of defendants:
Arson-2; Murder-7; Narcotics, possesson-4; Narcotics, sale-3; Sodomy-2; Volun-
tary Manslaughter-2.
b Driving while Intoxicated, a felony in Missouri.
A total of 422 docket studies were made in the eight survey counties.
Each study consisted of 32 questions about a felony case selected at random
from calendar 1962.' Most answers were multiple choice so that they could
be -key-punched onto cards and processed by computers. Data about the
age, sdx, race, -yieas of school completed, and offenses charged, of the de-
fendants whose files were studied are shown in Tables 2 through 5 respec-
4. The number of studies made in particular counties, and the method established to
guarantee that the sample would be random, were fixed by the American Bar Foundation
in the following instruction:
[TJhe first step is to ascertain the number of persons formally charged with felonies
in the year 1962 .... [The second step [is to] determine how many docket sheets
should be prepared for the county. Use the following table for this purpose
Number of Persons Number of Docket Sheets Random
Charged with Felonies (Sample size) Number
Less than 20 all
20 to 99 20 3
100 to 499 50 19
500 to 999 80 20
1,000 to 1,499 110 45
1,500 to 2,499 150 92
2,500 to 3,499 200 6 "
-3500 or more 250 16B.
The third step is td decide which cases to use .... The total number of persons
formally charged with felonies (first step above) should lie divided by the'sizb of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tively. Other information from the docket studies appears in subsequent
tables. Information obtained by interviews and mail questionnaires is scat-
tered throughout the article, but much of it is concentrated in Section IV,
which also contains a summary of the sources from which it came and the
sampling methods employed in obtaining it.
This report has been designated "preliminary" mainly because the amount
of material collected has made it impossible either to digest all of the in-
formation, or to pursue all of the inquiries that appeared to be pertinent.
For example, there was no time to determine whether significant relation-
ships exist between the types of offenses charged (Table 5) on the one hand,
and either the defendant's age (Table 2) or his race (Table 3) on the other.
Furthermore, much of this information did not appear to be directly relevant
to the problems of the indigent defendant, upon whom this report focuses.
Many of these matters have been relegated to an article which will appear
in a forthcoming issue of the LAw QUARTERLY.
This report is divided into five sections. Section I is an attempt to describe
the criminal law in operation. How the indigent accused fits into this sys-
tem is told in Section II, which deals mainly with problems peculiar to the
defendant unable to retain a lawyer of his own choosing. Section III con-
tinues this discussion by comparing and contrasting the treatment of the
indigent and the non-indigent. Section IV compiles the opinions of judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys throughout the state on the fairness of
the sample (column 2 in the table above). The quotient is the interval to use in
sampling. The first case to use is the one corresponding to the random number in
Column 3 of the above table. The second case to use is the one corresponding to
the random number plus the interval number. The third case is the one cor-
responding to the random number plus two times the interval number, and so on.
If the result is a mixed number or decimal, it should be rounded to the nearest
whole number.
Memorandum from American Bar Foundation to Reporters, June 3, 1963, pp. 2-3.
(Emphasis in the original.)
Reporters were instructed to make studies only of felony files, if possible. "Felony"
was defined as "a crime defined as a felony by state law and any other crime punishable
by imprisonment for longer than one year." Id. at 1.
The questions were: (1) State. (2) County. (3) Population size of county, 1960
census. (4) Name of defendant. (5) Docket number. (6) Age. (7) Sex. (8) Race.
(9) Years of school completed. (10) Date of arrest. (11) Was there a preliminary hear.
ing? (12) Date of preliminary hearing. (13) Date of filing of indictment, information,
etc. (14) Date of arraignment on indictment, information, etc. (15) Offense(s) charged.
(16) Was defendant released on bail? (17) Date released on bail. (18) Was bail
changed from original amount? (19) Date bail was changed. (20) Original amount of
ball set. (21) Final amount of bail set. (22) Was defendant determined to be indigent?
(23) Did defendant have counsel? (24) If name of counsel is known, insert here. (25)
Date Counsel first appeared or was appointed. (26) Is case still pending? (27) Dispo-
sition. (28) Date of disposition without trial. (29) Date trial began. (30) Sentence.
(31) Was defendant sentenced to a fixed term? (32) Was defendant sentenced to an
indeterminate term? (33) Remarks.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss3/3
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the present system and on desirable changes. Section V contains conclusions
and recommendations about which there was no substantial disagreement,
as well as my personal opinions about some present practices and proposed
changes.
Section I stresses points at which the practice of criminal law differs from
standards set by statutes, and Sections I and II underscore procedures in
the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County, where the state's two public
defenders are found. Both of these emphases can be justified. It is known
that the next session of the Missouri legislature, which will convene in a few
months, will be concerned with revising criminal procedure. The extent to
which the discretion of police officers, prosecutors and judges should be de-
fined by statute is one issue the legislature must deal with. It is also known
that a bill will be introduced that would establish public defenders in most,
and perhaps all, of the judicial circuits. The points of emphasis, therefore,
have been chosen with an eye to the problems that will be of immediate con-
cern to the state.
I. MISSOURI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Terminology
"Initial appearance" refers to the stage in the criminal process when an
accused for the first time is brought before a judicial officer. In Missouri
that officer would be a county magistrate, except in the City of St. Louis,
where he would be a judge of the Court of Criminal Correction. "Pre-
liminary hearing" refers to the proceeding in which a determination is made
that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe
the defendant committed it. This also takes place in the magistrate court or
the Court of Criminal Correction. "Arraignment" refers to the proceeding
in which the defendant is formally charged with a felony and enters his
plea. In Missouri this occurs in the circuit court.
B. From Arrest to Arraignment
Theoretically, the criminal process can be set in motion in either of two
ways: the accused can be arrested upon a warrant that has already been
issued, or he can be arrested without a warrant. Theoretically again, an
arrest with a warrant is "better" because a judicial officer, usually a magis-
trate, has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that the per-
son named has committed a crime, that is, because somebody besides a cop
has decided to arrest him. As far as protecting the rights of the accused is
concerned, however, it does not matter which procedure is followed because
the practice in Missouri does not resemble this theory. In the first place, no
Washington University Open Scholarship
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matter of "reasonable cause" judgment seems to be involved; the magistrate
must issue the warrant upon a sworn complaint. In the second place, the
magistrate's clerk, not the magistrate, issues the warrant if the complainant
is the prosecuting attorney,' as he invariably was in the survey counties.
Typically, the prosecutor listened to the complaining witness, prepared an
affidavit which the witness executed, prepared the warrant, took it before
the magistrate's clerk, and had it issued. Thus the decision traditionally be-
longing to the prosecutor, viz., whether a case can be made that justifies l-
ing an information, or seeking an indictment, against the person named, was
substituted in Missouri for the judicial determination of reasonable cause.'
That the two were virtually identical is further evidenced by the fact that
the informations filed in the survey counties were often verbatim copies of
the warrants.
Some of these statements must be qualified with respect to Jackson
County. The prosecuting attorney's office did prepare the warrants in that
county during 1962, but apparently it issued warrants at every request of the
police department without making any effort to screen weak cases. There-
fore, although it remains true that the determination of reasonable cause
was made by the prosecutor rather than a judicial officer, it is not true that
this decision was replaced by one that the case was strong enough to justify
filing an information. Since 1962, however, Jackson County has adopted
a system similar to that of the City of St. Louis. Inside the circuit attorney's
domain is the "warrant office," which is manned seven days a week by an
assistant circuit attorney. All warrants coming from the circuit attorney
originate from the warrant office. One duty of the assistant in charge of this
office is to refuse a warrant if the evidence presented to him would not
justify filing an information. This is perhaps the clearest example of substi-
tuting the prosecutor's decision for the theoretical judicial determination of
reasonable cause.
Most felony cases begin with the arrest of the defendant without a war-
rant. Missouri law provides that
All persons arrested and held in custody.., without warrant, for
the alleged commission of a criminal offense, or on suspicion thereof,
shall be discharged from such custody within twenty hours from the
time of arrest, unless they be held upon a warrant issued subsequent to
such arrest.7
5. Mo. Sup. CT. R. Cmm. P. 21.08:
Whenever complaint shall be made . . . it shall be the duty of the judge or magis-
trate thereof, and, upon complaint made by the prosecuting attorney, it shall also be the
duty of the clerk thereof to issue a warrant .... (Emphasis added.)
6. Cf. Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision, 1964 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1.
7. Mo. SuP. CT. R. Cams. P. 21.14.
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TABLE 6
NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN DATE OF ARREST AND
DATE OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
Same 30 or Longest Aver- Data No
County Day 1 2-3 4-6 7-13 14-29 More Delay agea Avail. Datab
Audrain 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 32 20.6 3 47
City of
St. Louis 0 0 0 0 20 29 10 61 21.4 59 85
Howell 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 8.0 1 19
Jackson 0 0 0 4 23 14 9 212 21.1 51 29
Jasper 4 0 0 0 5 3 5 145 25.0 17 33
Miller 3 0 0 3 1 1 0 17 5.1 8 10
Putnam 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 32 16.0 4 8
St. Louis 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 38 17.3 6 42
8 0 0 10 52 52 27 - 20.4 149 273
a For purposes of computing the average, a preliminary hearing on the same day as
arrest was counted as zero days delay.
bThis column includes all cases in which there was no preliminary hearing, either
because it was waived or because the formal charge was by grand jury indictment, in
addition to those few cases (seven) in which one date or the other was not available.
Missouri's courts, however, have refused to impose penalties upon the state
for violating the "20 hour rule,"" and hence it is sometimes ignored and
sometimes circumvented; how frequently could not be determined. In the
City of St. Louis, the practice shifted from disregard to circumvention fol-
lowing repeated protests by the circuit attorney. A defendant whom the St.
Louis police now wish to detain longer than 20 hours is released and im-
mediately re-arrested, a process known as "re-booking." The date and time
of arrest appearing on his record will be that of the re-booking.
Once the warrant has been issued and he is in custody (or vice versa),
the accused must be taken before a magistrate "as soon as practicable."9
The reporters were told this initial appearance usually occurred between
13 and 24 hours after arrest, except in St. Louis County. Unfortunately,
verifying these statements is impossible because the docket study failed to
request the date of initial appearance. Figures are available, however, show-
ing the elapsed time between the date of arrest and the date of preliminary
hearing. These are set out in Table 6. Of those counties yielding a significant
8. See State v. Bridges, 349 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Mo. 1961); State v. Scott, 298 S.W.2d
435, 438 (Mo. 1957).
9. Mo. SuP. CT. R. Can. P. 21.11. This rule is interpreted as applying to all arrested
persons, although it is reasonably subject to an interpretation limiting it to persons
arrested under a warrant. Compare Rule 21.11, with Rule 21.14.
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amount of data, only Miller averaged less than 10 days. If one assumes (a)
that the law requiring a preliminary hearing to be held within 10 days of
demand" was complied with, and (b) that only rarely did one side or the
other request a postponement, then the statements given the reporters were
inaccurate, except in Miller County. But assumption (b) is tenuous at best.
Parenthetically, it should be stressed that the figures in all tables appear-
ing in this report relate only to the 422 docket studies. They should not
be used to draw conclusions about the state as a whole because they are not
weighted to take account of the varying proportions of criminal cases
sampled in the survey counties, or of the varying proportions of the state's
total criminal business handled by the survey counties. There is nothing
wrong with concluding that the average delay between arrest and prelimi-
nary hearing was 20.4 days for the 422 cases studied, but it would be im-
proper to say that the average delay in all 1962 criminal cases was 20.4 days.
Similarly, with respect to Table 5, it is noteworthy that 96 of the 422 de-
fendants studied were charged with burglary, but it would be erroneous to
conclude that 23 percent of all felony defendants in the state were charged
with burglary. Weighted figures should be ready in time to appear in the
forthcoming supplemental report.
Magistrates are available at least five days a week everywhere. Such gen-
eral availability probably accounts for the statements that initial appearances
usually occur within 24 hours of arrest except in St. Louis County. The
criminal jurisdiction of all magistrates is county wide; they have jurisdic-
tion to try all misdemeanors, and to conduct initial appearances and pre-
liminary hearings in all felonies, committed within their counties. In the
smaller counties magistrates schedule these matters as the need arises, fitting
them between civil litigation. In the City of St. Louis, one of the judges of
the Court of Criminal Correction conducts initial appearances and pre-
liminary hearings daily; because this court has no civil jurisdiction, there
are no scheduling problems. In Jackson and St. Louis counties, however,
each magistrate schedules only one "criminal docket" a week, staggered so
that at least one such docket is being held every day but Sunday. In Jack-
son County, initial appearances will be sent to whichever one of the seven
magistrates is having a criminal docket that day. St. Louis County is dif-
ferent because the prosecuting attorney uses only two of the eight magis-
trates for preliminary felony proceedings; rarely is an initial appearance sent
to any of the other six magistrates." A person arrested here will have to wait
10. Mo. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 23.06.
11. The prosecuting attorney has absolute discretion to send any case, misdemeanor
or felony, to any of the magistrates, all of whom have county-wide jurisdiction. He
attempts to spread the misdemeanors evenly.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss3/3
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TADBL 7
AMOUNT OF BAIL&
01 0 M 0 o
(n C 1 (n 0 to .2 2 2 "
01 0 0 0
-0 0 0 CD 0CD~
county (D (D 0 0D ~
Audrain 3-3 3-3 19-20 21-20 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0 4-4
City of
St. Louis 0-0 0-0 0-0 108-103 3-3 11-11 4-5 1-3 5 12-14
Howell 0-0 0-0 0-0 13-13 0-0 1-1 0-0 0-0 0 6-6
Jackson 1-0 0-0 0-0 40-23 13-13 12-30 6-7 1-4 3 4-0
Jasper 0-0 0-1 2-2 31-30 3-2 7-7 2-1 0-0 0 5-7
Miller 0-0 0-0 1-1 2-2 0-0 11-11 0-0 0-0 0 4-4
Putnam 0-0 0-0 0-0 11-11 0-0 0-0 1-1 0-0 0 0-0
St. Louis 0-0 0-0 1-1 19-19 5-5 10-10 1-1 2-2 0 10-10
4-3 3-4 23-24 245-221 24-23 52-70 14-15 4-9 8 45-45
a The first figure in each column represents the number of cases in which the amount
shown was the original amount of bail, the second the number of cases in which it was the
final amount; a difference indicates that bail was changed. Usually the change occurs
at the arraignment; the circuit judge sets a different figure than the magistrate.
b A separate question, "Was bail changed?" made it possible to distinguish "no data"
from "no change" cases when the blank for "Final Amount of Bail" was left unanswered.
for his initial appearance until one of the two selected magistrates has a
criminal docket.
St. Louis County procedure is such that an arrested person with funds can
be released on bail without an initial appearance. Before issuing the warrant
to the prosecutor, the magistrate's clerk takes it to the magistrate who writes
the amount of bail across its face. The clerk sets the case for a preliminary
hearing on the next criminal docket day. The result is twofold: by posting
bond with the sheriff in the amount written on the warrant, the defendant
may make bail without ever having appeared before a magistrate, and his
first appearance is likely to coincide with his preliminary hearing.
All magistrates are required to be lawyers. This recent requirement, how-
ever, contained a grandfather clause allowing non-lawyer incumbents to
hold over. 2 Three of the survey counties had layman magistrates. Putnam
and Audrain counties each have only one magistrate, neither of whom is
a lawyer, but both of whom have long service. Two of the eight magistrates
12. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 482.030 (1959).
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in St. Louis County are not lawyers, but one of them is a law school gradu-
ate. The judges of the Court of Criminal Correction must also be lawyers.
The magistrate is required to set bail at the initial appearance."3 In all
survey counties, bail was set according to unwritten, flexible schedules de-
vised by each magistrate. Minimum felony bonds ranged from $500 in
Audrain to $1,500 in St. Louis County. Magistrates in border counties
stated that bail tended to be higher for non-residents. The figures in Table
714 disclose that bail was more likely to be increased than decreased if it
was changed. The number of persons whose bond was between $1,000 and
$2,999 decreased from 245 to 221, for example, while those whose bond
was between $5,000 and $9,999 increased from 52 to 70. A change usually
results from the circuit judge setting a different figure at the arraignment
than the magistrate set at the initial appearance. Since, however, the docket
studies do not reflect the circumstances surrounding a change, the figures
do not necessarily support a conclusion that judges were tougher than magis-
trates. The figures also show that there is no necessary correlation, direct or
inverse, between the amount of bail on the one hand and either the size
of the county, or its volume of criminal cases, on the other:
Percentage of cases in which the final
amount of bail was
less than $3,000. $5,000 or more.
Audrain 100 none
City of St. Louis 79.2 14.5
Howell 92.8 7.2
Jackson 28.7 51.2
Jasper 76.6 18.5
Miller 21.3 78.7
Putnam 91.6 8.4
St. Louis 52.6 34.1
The rarity of bonds between $3,000 and $5,000 (24, or about 6 percent, of
the 377 studies in which data were available) was unexplained.
The Missouri Rules provide that
No information charging the commission of a felony shall be filed
against any person unless the accused shall first have been accorded the
right of a preliminary examination before a magistrate in the county
where the offense is alleged to have been committed .....
13. Mo. SuP. Cr. R. Cim. P. 21.12 (arrest on warrant), 21.14 (arrest without war-
rant).
14. The first systematic program of releasing persons on their own recognizances was
begun in the City of St. Louis in 1963, one year too late to be reflected in the docket
studies, and hence in Table 7. The City program is discussed, and some of its results are
tabulated, in Section II G inf ra.
15. Mo. SuP. CT. R. Cnm-. P. 23.02.
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This rule has been interpreted to mean that a defendant must be told, at
his initial appearance, of his right to a preliminary hearing. But in the City
of St. Louis, a clerk of the Court of Criminal Correction simply read the
charge from the warrant and asked the defendant how he pleaded."0 A plea
of guilty was held to be a waiver of, one of not guilty a demand for, the
hearing."
The next sentence of the rule,
The accused may waive a preliminary examination after consultation,
or after being accorded the right of consultation, with his counsel.
had, so far as could be determined, never been obeyed in spirit. First, it
had always been interpreted as though the words "if he has one" were ap-
pended. Only two years ago the Missouri Supreme Court said that "neither
the federal or state constitution, nor any of our statutes require the magis-
trate to appoint counsel for the accused at the preliminary examination."' s
Second, until the Attorney General of Missouri told them otherwise just a
month before the survey, many magistrates doubted that they had power to
appoint counsel. 9 The result of these two influences was that magistrates
did not inform defendants of their right to counsel. Except in the City, they
began doing so after the attorney general delivered his opinion. It was too
early to tell, at the time of the survey, whether they would also begin making
appointments in preliminary felony proceedings. Some said they would;
others were waiting to see what action would be taken by a committee ap-
pointed by the supreme court to make recommendations about defense of the
indigent.
If the defendant demands one, a preliminary hearing must be scheduled
within 10 days. 0 The defendant may cross-examine the state's witnesses
and present his own. He may testify himself, but is subject to cross-exam-
ination. Although it rarely happened in the survey counties, the prosecutor
may reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. 2 If he does, the defendant may
16. This practice has changed since the survey. See text accompanying note 71 infra
for other changes that have taken place in the Court of Criminal Correction.
17. No one interviewed in the city remembered such a plea being used as a judicial
admission in later circuit court proceedings. Cf. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
18. State v. Turner, 353 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo. 1962).
19. Mo. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 207, June 21, 1963.
A few of the judges interviewed opposed providing lawyers for indigents at any pre-
arraignment stage on the grounds that a magistrate who might not be a lawyer (see text
accompanying note 12 supra) would have to make the appointments.
20. Mo. SuP. CT. R. CRum. P. 23.06. The preliminary hearing is governed by Rules
23.01-.12.
21. Reducing the charge to a misdemeanor presents special problems in the City of
St. Louis. As noted in the text, the City has two prosecutors, the Circuit Attorney for
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plead guilty on the spot and be sentenced by the magistrate, or he may
plead not guilty and stand trial, either then or later. Except in St. Louis
County, transcripts are made of preliminary hearings only in homicide
cases,22 or upon request. The requesting party, usually the defendant, must
arrange for and pay the stenographer, but it is not unusual for the state and
defense to split the cost. In St. Louis County, the public defender and the
prosecuting attorney have a standing agreement to transcribe all prelimi-
naries; each office alternately supplies a stenographer for the purpose.
If the formal accusation is by grand jury indictment, the defendant has no
right to a preliminary hearing because action by the grand jury is deemed
to satisfy the requirement of probable cause normally fulfilled by the pre-
liminary.2" In rural Missouri the charge is always by information; of the
eight survey counties, only the City of St. Louis, and Jackson and St. Louis
counties impanelled grand juries. Prosecutors in these counties denied having
any set policy as to which cases would be sent to the grand jury, although
they stated that indictments were most often sought in homicides and rapes.
There is no doubt, however, that tactical considerations influence the choice
of procedure. The most obvious of these is the desire to hide the strength or
weakness of the state's case. In at least some instances an indictment will be
sought solely to circumvent the preliminary hearing.
Table 8, which summarizes data about preliminary hearings, reveals that
approximately 25 percent of the felonies occurring in the City of St. Louis
were prosecuted by indictment rather than information. 24 Indeed, as can be
seen, the City was the only one of the survey counties that regularly made use
of the grand jury. When the circuit attorney decides to seek an indictment,
the words "Grand Jury" are typed on the warrant beneath the defendant's
name. This signals the docket clerk in the Court of Criminal Correction to
enter the case in a special grouping. The judge knows that the circuit at-
torney will request postponement of all cases in this group and that he there-
fore will not have to reserve court time for them. When such a case is called
for preliminary hearing, the circuit attorney requests a 10-day postpone-
ment, which is granted as a matter of course. Postponements will continue
felonies, the Prosecuting Attorney for misdemeanors. If the Circuit Attorney reduces the
charge to a misdemeanor in the Court of Criminal Correction he loses jurisdiction over it.
The Prosecuting Attorney must then be notified to assume the prosecution.
22. As required by Mo. SuP. CT. R. Cmu. P. 23.12.
23. State v. Cooper, 344 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961); State
v. Allen, 343 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1961).
24. Because felonies and misdemeanors are prosecuted by separate offices in the City,
and because the circuit attorney's files were used to compile the docket studies, it is known
that none of the 35 cases in the third column of Table 8 was a misdemeanor.
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TABLE 8
WAS THERE A PRELIMINARY HEARING? a
No
Type Reason No Total
County Yes Waived Caseb Unknown Total Data Cases
Audrain 3 44 1 0 45 2 50
(.06) (.88) (.02) (.90) (.04)
City of 59 44 35 6 85 0 144
St. Louis (.41) (.31) (.24) (.04) (.59)
Howell 2 15 0 0 15 3 20
(.10) (.75) (.75) (.15)
Jackson 59 12 3 2 17 4 80
(.74) (.15) (.04) (.03) (.21) (.05)
Jasper 16 31 0 0 31 3 50
(.32) (.62) (.62) (.06)
Miller 8 9 0 0 9 1 18
(.44) (.50) (.50) (.06)
Putnam 2 10 0 0 10 0 12
(.17) (.83) (.83)
St. Louis 7 32 2 0 34 7 48
(.15) (.67) (.04) (.71) (.14)
156 197 41 8 246 20 422
(.37) (.47) (.10) (.02) (.58) (.04) (1.00)
aNumbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b The full answer was 'No, not used in this kind of case." This category contains all
cases in which indictments rather than informations were used.
to be granted at 10-day intervals until an indictment is returned." The de-
fendant will then be bound over to the circuit court on the indictment.
Preliminary hearings were held in only 37 percent of the cases studied.
Jackson County, however, held preliminaries 74 percent of the time. Since
it also had a significantly higher than average proportion of nolle prosequis
(see Table 9), the question arose whether there was a correlation between
25. Since grand juries are empanelled monthly, this normally requires no more than
three postponements. An assistant circuit attorney told me that the judge never inquires
into the reasons for a postponement until three or more have been granted, from which
he drew the conclusion that the state "has a right" to three. He also indicated that
more than three postponements will be granted if there is a reason for them. One of the
more common reasons is that the victim is confined to the hospital, unable to testify.
26. The figures for "number of cases" in the chart differ from those in Table 8 be-
cause the chart analyzes only cases disposed of without trial, whereas Table 8 includes
all docket studies regardless of disposition.
About the problem discussed in the text, see generally Miller & Dawson, Non-Use of
the Preliminary Examination: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wis. L. Rzv. 252.
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the two. The results of comparing its dispositions-without-trial with those of
the City of St. Louis, the only other county with a substantial number of
preliminaries, were as follows: 6
Jackson City of All
County St. Louis Counties
Preliminary held:
No. of cases 51 54 134
Nol. Pros., dismissal, etc. 24 (47%) 4 (7%) 35 (26%)
Plea/G, prin. off. 14 (27%) 45 (83%) 75 (56%)
Plea/G, lesser off. 13 (25%) 5 (9%) 24 (18%)
Preliminary not held:
No. of cases 16 77 221
No]. Pros., dismissal, etc. 4 (25%) 8 (10%) 39 (18%)
Plea/G, prin. off. 6 (38%) 54 (70%) 140 (63%)
Plea/G, lesser off. 6 (38%) 15 (19%) 42 (19%)
The figures suggest that a Jackson County defendant's chances for a pre-
trial no-conviction disposition increased 22 percentage points (from 25 to
47) if he insisted upon a preliminary hearing. One possible explanation
is that the Jackson County preliminary hearing was used in 1962 to screen
the obviously inadequate case, a function performed in other counties by the
prosecuting attorney at the time of the request for a warrant. This also
could account for the very high proportion of preliminary hearings in that
county. In the City of St. Louis, whether a preliminary hearing was held
seemed to make no significant difference whether the case would be dis-
posed of before trial without a conviction. It did seem to make a difference,
however, whether the City defendant would be permitted to plead to a
lesser offense:
Jackson City of
County St. Louis
Preliminary held:
Total pleas of guilty 27 50
Principal offense 14 (52%) 45 (90%)
Lesser offense 13(48%) 5 (10%)
Preliminary not held:
Total pleas of guilty 12 69
Principal offense 6 (50%) 54 (78%)
Lesser offense 6 (50%) 15 (22%)
These figures would indicate that a City defendant had a better chance of
pleading to a lesser offense if he waived his preliminary. One possible ex-
planation is that indigent defendants were so inept at managing their de-
fenses at the preliminaries7 that they later were unable to bargain success-
27. In 1962, lawyers for indigents, whether appointed or, in the City of St. Louis,
the public defender, almost never appeared until the arraignment. See Section II E infra.
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fully for lesser pleas. This hardly rises above speculation, however, since it
is not accurate for Jackson County, where indigents were also unrepresented
at preliminary hearings. Perhaps the only safe conclusion is that the survey
failed to uncover data proving a link between preliminary hearings on the
one hand, and dither no-trial dispositions, or the degree of offense to which a
defendant was permitted to plead, on the other. Explanations, if there are
any, for the phenomena in the charts must be sought elsewhere, or in
different data.
Preliminary hearings are an important, and sometimes the only, defense
discovery procedure. This is true in spite of Missouri law that requires the
names of all prosecution witnesses to be endorsed on the information, and
gives the defendant the right to depose them.28 First, failure to endorse a
witness's name will not necessarily preclude his testimony, nor will the ad-
mission of such testimony necessarily be reversible error.2 " Surprise wit-
nesses, in other words, are still possible. Second, the right to take depositions
is a hollow one if the defendant is without funds. Third, there is evidence
that some prosecuting attorneys interfere with the defendant's right by in-
structing the victim of the crime not to discuss it with the defendant's law-
yer,30 apparently on the theory that he is a "participant" in the trial rather
than a "witness." Finally, the statutes do not give the defendant a right to
view exhibits. At least some of these handicaps can be overcome by an adroit
use of the preliminary hearing.
If, then, the indigent defendant either waives his preliminary, or is bound
over to the circuit court on an indictment, discovery will just about be lim-
ited to what the prosecuting attorney chooses to reveal. All of Missouri's 115
prosecutors were asked,3 "Do you disclose to defense counsel such things as
confessions, statements of witnesses, reports of expert witnesses, exhibits, etc?
Please specify those things you do disclose and those things you do not." Of
the 72 responding to this question, 33 said they grant full disclosure,8" one
of -them qualifying "except for statements of witnesses." Two more disclose
"everything that could be discovered" under the statute. Twenty-two replied
28. Mo. SuP. Cr. R. Clm. P. 24.17, 25.10; Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 545.070, .240 (1959).
29. See, e.g., State v. Farris, 243 S.W.2d 983 (Mo. 1951).
30. See State v. Berstein, 372 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1963), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 970
(1964); State v. Solven, 371 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963) (en bane); Brief for Appellant, pp.
2-3, State v. Aubuchon, No. 49,909, Mo. Sup. Ct., April Sess. 1964.
31. Details about the methods employed in obtaining information from the prosecut-
ing attorneys are found in Section IV B infra.
32. Prosecutors who answered this question with a simple "yes" or "no" were counted
as practicing full disclosure or no disclosure, respectively. More complete answers that
overlapped the categories in the text were nevertheless counted only in the one category
that appeared most appropriate..
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TABLE 9
DISPOSITIONS WITHOUT TRIAL"
Comm. P/G Total
to Prin. P/G Disp.
Nol. Dis- Ment. Off. Lesser w/o Total
County Pros. missedb Hosp. Chgd. Off. Trial Cases
Audrain 3 10 0 26 9 48 50
(.06) (.20) (.52) (.18) (.96)
City of 9 3 0 99 20 131 144
St. Louis (.06) (.02) (.69) (.14) (.91)
Howell 6 0 1 11 0 18 20
(.30) (.05) (.55) (.90)
Jackson 29 1 0 21 20 71 80
(.36) (.01) (.26) (.25) (.89)
Jasper 8 0 1 26 2 37 50
(.16) (.02) (.52) (.04) (.74)
Miller 4 0 0 7 3 14 18
(.22) (.39) (.17) (.78)
Putnam 1 0 0 8 1 10 12
(.08) (.67) (.08) (.83)
St. Louis 6 0 0 24 15 45 48
(.12) (.50) (.31) (.94)
66 14 2 222 70 374 422
(.16) (.04) (.005) (.52) (.17) (.89)
a Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b This category includes, in addition to dismissals, sustained motions to suppress evi-
dence and to quash the indictment or information.
that how much they disclose depends upon the circumstances; the three
''circumstances" most often mentioned were the nature of the case, the
lawyer on the other side, and the likelihood of being able to induce a guilty
plea (by revealing a strong case). Four disclose nothing but confessions;
two more disclose nothing but confessions and an occasional exhibit. One
prosecutor said that he advises the defense attorney when he has a confes-
sion, but does not reveal its contents. Eight admitted a practice of disclosing
nothing at all, three of them adding that they think discovery procedures
are adequate. If these answers reflect Missouri practice generally, less than
half the time (35 of 72) will a defendant who cannot afford depositions be
able to regain discovery opportunities lost without a preliminary hearing,
while the non-indigent will have to pay to recover what were his free.
If the preliminary hearing results in a finding of probable cause, or is
waived, or if a grand jury returns an indictment, the prosecutor next files
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a formal charge against the defendant in the circuit court.3 The formal
charge may be by indictment or information. Usually it is the latter, and
typically it is a verbatim copy of the warrant. The defendant is then brought
before the circuit court and arraigned, 4 that is, he is told what felony he is
accused of having committed and asked how he pleads. If he is going to
plead guilty, he normally does so at this point.
Table 9 lists the various ways in which cases that did not reach trial were
disposed of. Of the 422 docket studies, 374, or 89 percent, were terminated
at some pre-trial stage, 292, or 69 percent, upon pleas of guilty. Eighty
cases, or 20 percent, were nolle pros'ed or dismissed. Because a number of
prosecutors in small counties had indicated that much of their time was de-
voted to bad check cases" (see Table 5), and some of them admitted the
practice of dismissing criminal charges if restitution was made, I thought
there might be a correspondence between counties having higher than aver-
age percentages of the two. The results of comparing them were incon-
clusive, however:
Number Forgery or Nol. Pros.
of Cases Bad Check or Dism.
Audrain 50 17 (34%) 13 (26%)
City of St. Louis 144 1 (0.7%) 12 (8%)
Howell 20 2 (10%) 6 (30%)
Jackson 80 7 (9%) 30 (37%)
Jasper 50 12 (24%) 8 (16%)
Miller 18 3 (17%) 4 (22%)
Putnam 12 2 (17%) 1(8%)
St. Louis 48 6 (13%) 6 (13%)
A remarkable feature of Table 9 is the figure that 69 percent of the docket
studies from the City of St. Louis were disposed of before trial by pleas of
guilty to the principal offense charged.3" One explanation for this unusually
high percentage might be the care taken by the circuit attorney in making
the decision to issue the warrant, a procedure described earlier. The explan-
ation might be, in other words, that the warrant is only issued for a charge
that can be made to stick, and hence there is no need to bargain it down
33. The magistrate is required to certify "all papers in connection with the hearing"
to the circuit court within 10 days "unless the court shall sooner convene." MO, SUP. CT.
R. Ca m. P. 23.11.
34. Defendant "shall not be required to plead" to an indictment or information "until
he shall have had a reasonable time in which to examine the same." MO. SuP. CT. R.
CRm. P. 25.03.
35. And non-support cases. But since non-support is not a felony, such cases were not
picked up in the docket studies and do not influence the discussion in the text.
36. According to the circuit attorney's records for 1962, 1,232 defendants pleaded
guilty as charged out of 1,780 total cases. The percentage derived from these figures
coincides exactly with that from the docket study sampling.
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later. But that almost certainly is not the whole story. Another part of the
criminal process in the City that must be considered is the so-called "pre-
arraignment conference."
C. The St. Louis Pre-Arraignment Conference
A number of reasons, in addition to trying to explain the large number of
pleas as charged, can be offered for describing the City pre-arraignment
conference in some detail. One is that, so far as I have been able to deter-
mine, it is the only formally-structured bargaining process in the country.
Another is that the vast majority of defendants who pass through it are in-
digent.
Arraignments are scheduled in the City only once a week, on Thursdays.
That morning, defendants who have been either bound over by the Court
of Criminal Correction or indicted by the grand jury since the previous
Thursday, and who have not been released on bail, are transferred from the
jail to a cell behind the courtroom. The circuit judge who will do the ar-
raigning is kept waiting until all such prisoners have been through the pre-
arraignment conference. Occasionally a defendant who has been released on
bond will appear, sometimes with, sometimes without, an attorney, but this
is rare. More often, but still infrequently, a defendant yet in custody will
have retained an attorney who will appear with him.
The circuit attorney's office prepares for the weekly conference by making
a typewritten list of the persons to be arraigned that week and by evaluating
the cases against them. The list contains, besides the defendant's name, his
case file number, the current charge against him, and the number, but not
the nature, of all previous convictions. A typical entry, for example, might
read
"887-L John Doe
3 P.C. & C.C.W."
which would mean that John Doe, who has three prior convictions, is
charged with carrying a concealed weapon by an information numbered
887-L. Cases are evaluated by the circuit attorney, his first assistant and his
chief trial assistant, or by as many of them as can get together, on Wednesday
afternoon. They agree upon the minimum sentence to be recommended in
exchange for a plea to the charge, and put a note of the sentence in the
dossier. Any one of these three men, but no one else, has authority to recom-
mend a lighter sentence in later bargaining.
The conferences are held in an unoccupied office down the corridor from
the transfer cell. Two deputy sheriffs escort the defendants, one at a time,
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between the office and the cell."' One of them announces the defendant's
name as he enters. I was told that each defendant is informed that every-
thing said during the conference is confidential and nothing will be used
against him. If so, however, they must be told before entering the conference
room, for none of the 29 defendants whose conferences I witnessed were told
in my presence.
The defendant sits facing four men across a desk. One is a detective
sergeant from the police department on permanent assignment to the circuit
attorney's office. He has before him the prosecutor's complete files on all
defendants who are to be arraigned that day. He does most of the talking
for the prosecution. Beside him sits either the circuit attorney or one of the
two assistants who have authority to reduce the recommended sentence. A
public defender sits at one end of the desk. He has the typewritten list and a
form on each defendant completed by his office during an interview con-
ducted in the jail while the defendant was awaiting arraignment. 8 The
chief probation and parole officer for the circuit court sits at the other end
of the desk.
The three "conferences" summarized were selected as representative of the
ways in which different kinds of problems were handled. They are accurate
summaries of actual incidents, except that I warrant the quotations to be
only substantially correct.
Defendant I was charged in separate informations with three armed rob-
beries; he had three prior convictions. The public defender introduced
himself and identified the others sitting at the desk. Upon being told by
defendant that he could not afford counsel, the public defender explained
the purpose of the arraignment and told defendant that a lawyer would be
appointed for him by the court unless he decided to plead guilty now, in
which case he, the defender, would represent him. The defender asked,
"How did you get into trouble?" Defendant replied that his wife had be-
come ill and required three operations, after the last of which she had died.
He said he had comnitted the robberies while his wife was alive to pay off
medical bills. He said two policemen, whom he named, had promised him a
light sentence if he confessed. The circuit attorney asked what the police
had promised, and defendant answered, three to five years. "That's prepos-
terous! I never talked to the police about you. Anyway, you've been around
-how could you believe I would recommend three to five when you got
[he glanced into defendant's file] fifteen on your last fall?" Defendant
37. They also talk and laugh among themselves, drum their fingers on the desk, tap
their feet on the floor, and otherwise create disturbances while the conferences are taking
place.
38. Detailed information about these interview forms is contained in Section II F infra.
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shrugged and remained silent. The defender asked what recommendation
would be made for a plea of guilty. The circuit attorney's answer was, "A
reasonable recommendation would be 12 years. The regular recommenda-
tion for cases of this kind-three priors for [another glance at the file] armed
robbery-is 15 years." The defender told the prisoner, "Based upon my
experience, you would be very lucky to get off with 10 years if you are con-
victed." Then to the circuit attorney, "Would you recommend 10 years?"
"No--12 years." The probation officer stated that the information about
the deceased wife's operations would appear in a pre-sentence report, if it
were true, and that the judge who would be taking pleas always requested
such reports. He asked defendant how long it had been since his last convic-
tion. Defendant answered that he had been released from the penitentiary
six years earlier and had been clean until the current series of robberies. The
defender said, "I think the best thing for you to do is plead not guilty this
morning. I will ask the court to assign you a lawyer. Then he can check
into your story and if it's true maybe work something out." Elapsed time:
18 minutes.
Defendant 2 was accused of stealing over $50 by stripping an automobile;
he had one prior conviction. When his name was announced, the police
sergeant exclaimed, "My God, are you here again? What did you do this
time?" "I didn't do nothing. You cops just got it in for me. All I was doing
was standing on the street." Sergeant: "Sure you were. How many times
now have you been accidentally standing on the street next to a car that has
just been stripped and been the only one arrested-[referring to file] eight?
No, nine." "You never convicted me on one of those, either." "Well, we've
got you this time. How much will you take?" "I might take six months in
the workhouse [i.e., plead guilty to a misdemeanor]." The sergeant laughed,
threw defendant's file onto the completed stack, and said, "Go away."
Elapsed time: two minutes.
Defendant 3, charged with stealing over $50, had no prior convictions. 9
The public defender introduced himself and the others, asked about his
ability to hire a lawyer, explained the arraignment, etc. While this was hap-
pening, the circuit attorney was called out of the room. Defendant said that
he had worked for the man who complained against him. His employer
contracted to do janitor work in large office buildings and defendant had
been his foreman in St. Louis. The business was headquartered in Spring-
field, Missouri. The employer required defendant to drive to Springfield, a
39. Because Defendant 3 was a first offender, he would be represented by the public
defender throughout, and would not have a lawyer appointed by the court, as would
Defendants 1 and 2. See Section II F infra for a description of the first-offender limita-
tion on the St. Louis public defender.
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distance of more than 200 miles, every Friday to pick up the paychecks for
his crew. The parole officer asked, "Did he pay you extra for this?" "No
sir." "Expenses?" "No sir, nothing." On one Friday, defendant called his
employer, told him he had no money to buy gasoline for the trip, and asked
that the checks be mailed. The employer refused and ordered defendant to
drive out and pick up the checks. When defendant insisted he had no
money, the employer told him to borrow some. Defendant pawned one of
the commercial floor buffers belonging to his employer to obtain the money.
He and his employer got into an argument when he arrived at Springfield,
and defendant was fired. He said he forgot about the buffer until some
months later when he discovered the pawn ticket in his wallet. He took the
ticket to the foreman who had replaced him, explained the circumstances,
and asked to be notified what it cost to redeem the buffer so that he could
make restitution. Apparently, however, the buffer had already been sold.
When the employer learned this, he filed charges against defendant. De-
fender: "What are you recommending in this case?" Sergeant: "Two
years." Defender: "That's unreasonable. You've never been in trouble
before, have you son?" Defendant: "They picked me up in Springfield once
for a bad check, but that was a mistake. I paid the money, and nothing
happened." Defender: "Two years is too much." Sergeant: "I agree with
you, but you know I can't reduce it. The circuit attorney isn't here." De-
fender: "Have you got a 'Hoover sheet'4 on him?" Sergeant: "No, it hasn't
come yet." Defender: "Suppose we do this. Suppose we enter a guilty plea
this morning to the felony. Then if his 'Hoover sheet' shows he is clean, we
can come back later and get it reduced to a misdemeanor." Sergeant:
"Nothing doing. I'm not about to be withdrawing pleas to felonies and
substituting pleas to misdemeanors. Let's pass the case till next week. Have
him plead not guilty this morning and we can talk about it again next week."
The circuit attorney returned at this point, and the police sergeant recited
the story defendant had told earlier, adding, "I think our recommenda-
tion is too high." The circuit attorney reduced the charge to a misdemeanor
and agreed to recommend a six-months sentence. Parole officer: "You will
make application for probation and my office will make the report on you.
If you have been telling the truth, I think you have a good chance of being
put on probation." Defender: "You understand, of course, that we can't
promise you anything. It's up to the judge to say what the sentence will be
and whether you will be put on probation. But the prosecutor is going to
40. A "Hoover sheet" is a record obtainable by police departments from the FBI
listing the person's arrests and convictions. Assuming that all departments accurately re-
port these matters to the FBI, the record contains a complete history of the person's prior
contacts with the criminal law no matter where in the nation they occurred.
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recommend six months, and the parole officer is going to recommend pro-
bation. I think you ought to take it." Defendant: "O.K., if you say so."
Defender: "All right. When we get into court, the prosecutor will say the
charge has been reduced and I will say that I represent you and that you
want to plead guilty. The judge will ask you if you have talked this over
with me, and you tell him yes. Then you will be sent back to jail-how long
will it take to get that pre-sentence investigation?" Parole officer: "A couple
of weeks or less. Not long, if he has been telling the truth." Defender:
"You will be sent back to jail until the judge studies that report, and then
you will be sentenced, and the parole officer says you have a good chance
for probation. You understand all this?" Defendant: "Yes sir." Elapsed
time: 45 minutes.
No figures are available to show what proportion of City defendants who
plead guilty do so immediately upon their arraignment, i.e., following, or as
a result of, the pre-arraignment conference. In many, if not most, instances,
bargaining for pleas follows the typical pattern of the individual defense
lawyer negotiating with the circuit attorney. This almost always occurs,
for example, when the defendant has been released on bond before his ar-
raignment and therefore misses the conference. It also occurs for many
defendants who are put through the conference procedure. For one reason
or another they plead not guilty at their arraignments, lawyers are appointed
for them, and the lawyers thereafter bargain in the usual manner. It is
therefore impossible to prove, with the present lack of information, what this
unique procedure contributes to the high percentage of pleas-as-charged in
the City, or even, indeed, that it makes a contribution. That some account of
it must be taken seems indisputable nevertheless.
D. Arraignment and Thereafter
Although a defendant who intends to plead guilty often does so at his
arraignment, the judge is not required to accept the plea:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge. 1
Judges in the eight survey counties seemed to adhere to this rule scrupulously.
Their questioning of defendants was more detailed than one might have
expected. Some judges recited the maximum penalty permissible and asked
defendant whether he was aware that he could be sentenced to it. One
judge who followed this practice stated that he considered the maximum
penalty a vital part of "the nature of the charge."
41. Mo. SUP. CT. R. Cium. P. 25.04.
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Heretofore, the practice in Missouri has been to appoint counsel for indi-
gent defendants at the arraignment. Counsel is not often waived in Missouri,
partly because of the exacting supreme court rule on the subject:
If any person charged with the commission of a felony appears upon
arraignment without counsel, it shall be the duty of the court to advise
him of his right to counsel, and of the willingness of the court to appoint
counsel to represent him if he is unable to employ counsel. If the de-
fendant so requests, and if it appears that the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint counsel to
represent him. If, after being informed as to his rights, the defendant
indicates his desire to proceed without the benefit of counsel, and the
court finds that he has intelligently waived his right to have counsel,
the court shall have no duty to appoint counsel unless it appears to the
court that, because of the gravity of the offense charged and other
circumstances affecting the defendant, the failure to appoint counsel
may result in injustice to the defendant.2
Judges in the survey counties were particularly conscious of the italicized
clauses, and repeatedly called attention to the words "intelligently waived"
and "may result in injustice." As a consequence, reporters were told,
waiver is not permitted, even on pleas of guilty, in seven of the eight counties
surveyed. Results of the mail questionnaires were not as dramatic. Judges
and prosecutors both were asked, "Of those felony defendants who are in-
digent, what percentage waive appointment of a lawyer to represent them?"
Of the 68 prosecutors who responded, 13 said that waiver is not permitted,
and another 13 answered "zero," which may or may not indicate a policy
against waiver. Six of the 23 circuit judges replying by mail do not permit
waivers.1
3
The figures in Table 10 do not entirely support what the reporters were
told. They indicate that defendants were unrepresented in 22 of the 422
cases studied. Thirteen of these cases are from Audrain County, where
waiver is permitted, and there is no reason to challenge that figure. The four
cases from Putnam County are doubtful, however. The files in three of
these cases simply failed to reflect the appearance of an attorney. It would
seem questionable, given the haphazard record-keeping found almost every-
where, to conclude that a defendant had been unrepresented simply because
42. Mo. SuP. CT. R. CmAu. P. 29.01. (Emphasis added.) A more extended dis-
cussion of waivers will be found in Section II D infra.
43. Of course the question was asked only about indigent defendants, but there is no
reason to suppose a different policy would be applied to non-indigents.
Two of the judges interviewed mentioned instances in which headstrong defendants
absolutely had refused to accept attorneys and insisted upon trying their own cases.
Both judges appointed lawyers to sit at the counsel table with the defendants to advise
them upon request. Neither asked for help, and both were convicted.
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TABLE 10
DID DEFENDANT HAVE COUNSEL?,
Yes No
Publ. No No No Total
County Ret. Ass. Def. Det.b Total Waived Det.b Total Data Cases
Audrain 17 6 - 0 23 4 9 13 14 50
(.34) (.12) (.46) (.08) (.18) (.26) (.28)
City of 63 18 54 3 138 0 0 0 6 144
St. Louis (.44) (.13) (.37) (.02) (.96) (.04)
Howell 3 3 - 0 6 0 1 1 13 20
(.15) (.15) (.30) (.05) (.05) (.65)
Jackson 39 33 - 7 79 0 0 0 1 80
(.49) (.41) (.09) (.99) (.01)
Jasper 33 11 - 1 45 0 2 2 3 50
(.66) (.22) (.02) (.90) (.04) (.04) (.06)
Miller 11 3 - 0 14 0 2 2 2 18
(.61) (.17) (.78) (.11) (.11) (.11)
Putnam 6 2 - 0 8 0 4 4 0 12
(.50) (.17) (.67) (.33) (.33)
St. Louis 25 14 - 1 40 0 0 0 8 48
(.52) (.29) (.02) (.83) (.17)
197 90 54 12 353 4 18 22 47 422
(.47) (.21) (.13) (.02) (.84) (.01) (.04) (.05) (.11) (1.00)
£ Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b No details about circumstances available.
no notice of appearance had been filed. But I suspect the same conclusion
was drawn from the same evidence in other counties. Although there is no
way to prove it, I think, in other words, that some of the cases listed in the
"No Details" column on the right side of Table 10 should properly appear
in the "No Data" column.
The judge in Audrain County followed a set routine when a defendant
wished to waive counsel. He explained the significance of the arraignment,
made sure the defendant knew the charge and the maximum penalty, ex-
plained that counsel can be helpful, told him that an attorney would be ap-
pointed without cost, and urged him to accept the appointment.
Nothing need be said about Missouri trials since they do not differ ma-
terially from those conducted anywhere else. Table 11 lists the results of the
34 cases that went to trial, and shows that within each of the two categories,
jury and non-jury, the number of acquittals approximately equalled the
number of convictions.
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TABLE 11
DISPOSITIONS WITH TRIAL
Non-Jury Jury
P/G Found Guilty Total
Prin. Prin. Lesser Found Dispo.
County Ga N/G Total Off. Off. Off. N/Gb Total withTrial
Audrain 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2
City of St. Louis 1 0 1 20 4 1 4 11 12
Howell 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Jackson 0 1 1 0 3 0 5 8 9
Jasper 2 2 4 0 0 0 3 3 7
Miller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Putnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
St. Louis 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 3
3 4 7 2 10 1 14 27 34
a Guilty of principal offense charged in all cases.
b Includes one verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (City of St. Louis) and one
directed verdict of acquittal (Jasper).
0 Pleaded guilty after trials commenced.
Table 12 analyzes the 422 docket studies by the method of disposal and
by the end result. The percentage of cases resulting in convictions varied
from 55 percent (Howell, Jackson and Miller counties) to 88 percent (City
of St. Louis). The interesting thing is that these variations were caused by
variations in the cases disposed of without trial; there were no significant
differences between counties in conviction percentages of cases disposed of
with trials. One could conclude, perhaps, that the significant decisions in
the criminal process as a whole were made in the largely invisible stages pre-
ceding the trials.
Two kinds of probation exist in Missouri, "bench parole"'" and "proba-
tion."45 The difference between the two, as commonly used," is that a
44. Authority for both bench paroles and probation is now Mo. Rav. STAT. §
549.071 (Supp. 1963). Formerly, authority for bench paroles was Mo. Rav. STAT. §
549.070 (1959).
45. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 549.071 (Supp. 1963).
46. Actually, the superseded Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 549.190 (1959) would seem to have
authorized both procedures. The usage in the text was that given reporters by judges,
prosecutors and parole officers in the survey counties. The usage is consistent with
language in the new enactments: "The circuit and criminal courts of this state . . . have
power... to place on probation or to parole ... ." Mo. Rav. STAT. § 549.061 (Supp.
1963). "[T]he court . . .may in its discretion . . .suspend the imposition of sentence
or may pronounce sentence and suspend the execution thereof. .. ." Mo. Rav. STAT. §
549.071 (Supp. 1963).
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TABLE 12
DISPOSITIONS OF CASES&
W/O Non-Jury Jury Not
Trial Trial Trial Total Disp.
County G N/Gb G N/G G N/G G N/Gb of Total
Audrain 35 13 0 1 0 1 35 15 0 50
(.70) (.26) (.05) (.05) (.70) (.30)
City of 119 12 1 0 7 4 127 16 1 144
St. Louis (.83) (.08) (.01) (.05) (.03) (.88) (.11) (.01)
Howell 11 7 0 0 0 1 11 8 1 20
(.55) (.35) (.05) (.55) (.40) (.05)
Jackson 41 30 0 1 3 5 44 36 0 80
(.51) (.37) (.01) (.04) (.06) (.55) (.45)
Jasper 28 9 2 2 0 3 30 14 6 50
(.56) (.18) (.04) (.04) (.06) (.60) (.28) (.12)
Miller 10 4 0 0 0 0 10 4 4 18
(.55) (.22) (.55) (.22) (.22)
Putnam 9 1 0 0 0 0 9 1 2 12
(.75) (.08) (.75) (.08) (.17)
St. Louis 39 6 0 0 3 0 42 6 0 48
(.81) (.13) (.06) (.87) (.13)
292 82 3 4 13 14 308 100 14 422
(.69) (.20) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.73) (.24) (.03) (1.00)
a Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b This column includes all cases in which no conviction resulted, such as nolle prosequs,
dismissals, etc.
sentence has been imposed, but its execution has been suspended, in a bench
parole, while the imposition of the sentence has been suspended in a pro-
bation; the defendant released on a bench parole will have been sentenced
already, but the defendant released on probation will not have been sen-
tenced. Both are on probation, as that term is normally understood, since
both will have been placed under the supervision of the appropriate proba-
tion and parole board. The suspended sentence without supervision is vir-
tually non-existent in Missouri.' So far as the reporters could determine,
it is used almost exclusively in two kinds of cases: (1) where a hold order
against the defendant is outstanding from another state or another county
within Missouri; and (2) where the defendant is young, has no past record,
and has promised to enlist in the armed forces.
Bench paroles were more often used than probations, especially in cir-
cuits covering more than one county, because their revocation was easier.
47. Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 549.071 (Supp. 1963) would seem to authorize it, however.
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All the judge needed to do to send the bench parolee to prison was notify
the circuit clerk in the county where he was tried that the parole had been
revoked, and order that the sentence be executed. 8 In the case of a proba-
tioner, he had to journey to that county, convene court, and impose sentence.
However, probations were often granted to young defendants. Influencing
the judge to prefer this method over the bench parole was the fact that in
Missouri a person is not deemed to have been convicted of a crime if a sen-
tence has never been imposed.49
II. THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT
A. Scope of the Problem
When we speak of "indigent persons accused of crime in Missouri," how
many people are we talking about? What is the magnitude of the prob-
lem posed by the recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning
indigents? These fundamental questions cannot be answered with any-
thing better than an educated guess. Before the nationwide survey, about
the only data available were "estimates" supplied by officials engaged in ad-
ministering the criminal law. But an analysis of the data obtained in the
eight survey counties argues that such estimates may not be accurate. Every
judge and prosecutor interviewed during the survey was asked to estimate
the number of indigent felony defendants processed by his court annually.
48. This was the procedure before the probation and parole statutes were revised in
late 1963. See Mo. Rxv. STAT. §§ 549.070, 549.090 (1959). Whether it is permissible
under the new statutes is questionable. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 549.101 (Supp. 1963)
authorizes the court to order the apprehension of the defendant "by the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and his appearance in court forthwith." (Emphasis added.) The
statute goes on to provide, however, that "the court may in its discretion with or without
hearing order the probation or parole revoked .... " (Emphasis added.) It is not clear
what purpose the "appearance in court forthwith" is supposed to serve if (a) there
is not to be a hearing, and (b) the defendant has already been sentenced (bench
parole). Nothing in the statutes limits the situations in which § 549.101 may be used;
apparently, therefore, probation may be revoked without a hearing as long as the judge
purports to act under it.
Mo. REv. STAT § 549.254 (Supp. 1963) requires a hearing, but appears to be applica-
ble only to probationers and bench parolees arrested "for violation of the conditions of pro-
bation, or a notice to appear to answer a charge of violation." Suppose the probation officer
reports to the judge that defendant has violated a condition of probation, and recom-
mends revocation; what is to prevent the judge from proceeding under § 549.101, without
a hearing, instead of § 549.254? Apparently nothing, so long as the judge does not cite
the reason for revocation. It would seem, therefore, unless § 549.101 is construed to
make the defendant's "appearance in court forthwith" mandatory even when there is
going to be no hearing and he has already been sentenced, that the practice described
in the text could be continued.
49. Meyer v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 183 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
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The estimates of officials in each county were averaged together and com-
pared with results of the docket studies.5" The estimates were:
49 percent too high in County 1;
19 percent too high in County 2;
12 percent too high in County 3;
on the nose in County 4;
2 percent too low in County 5;
5 percent too low in County 6;
14 percent too low in County 7; and
28 percent too low in County 8.
Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that percentages of indigency
fluctuate from year to year, depending upon national and local economic
conditions, and that the persons interviewed were asked the question in
1963, whereas the docket studies were taken from 1962 files. Unfortunately,
"estimates" are all we have to work with outside the survey counties, and I
have used them to try to guess the annual number of indigent felony defen-
dants in Missouri. All the ways error could be introduced into this calcula-
tion have been put into footnotes, however, so that the reader can form a
conclusion about how educated the guess is.
Mail questionnaires asked judges and prosecutors throughout the state to
estimate the annual percentage of felony defendants in their circuit or
county who are indigent. These were the results:
FAtimated Percent Judges Prosecutors
Indigent: (Circuits) (Counties)
0 to 24 1 11
25 to 49 6 7
50 to 74 4 24
75 to 100 12 25
No answer 12 40
35 107
Seventy percent of the judges (16 of 23), and 73 percent of the prosecutors
(49 of 67), who answered thought their indigency rates were 50 percent
or higher.
The estimate given by each judge was multiplied by the number of cases
50. For purposes of determining the percentage of indigents shown, docket studies
containing no data about the subject were ignored. This is an obvious source of po-
tential error, particularly in Howell and Putnam counties, where data were available
in only 6 of 20, and 2 of 12, cases, respectively.
51. Counties are listed in a different order here than elsewhere to prevent embarrass-
ment.
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filed in his circuit, as reported by the Judicial Conference."2 The estimate
of each prosecutor was multiplied by the number of cases filed in his county.
When the sum of the prosecutors' estimates in any circuit differed from the
estimate of the judge, the average of all of them was taken. In the survey
counties, the Judicial Conference figure was multiplied by the percentage
derived from the docket studies. Two figures were now available for each
county and circuit from which information had been obtained, the number
of cases filed, and the estimated number of indigent defendants. Totaling the
figures in each category separately, the sums were 7,737 cases filed and
3,857 estimated indigent, a percentage of 49.8. This percentage was multi-
plied by the Judicial Conference figure for cases filed in counties from which
no data had been obtained. Adding these to the figures previously derived,
the sums were 4,544 estimated indigent out of 9,167 cases.
In spite of the obvious shortcomings of the method, it does not seem un-
reasonable to conclude that Missouri has something in excess of 4,000 indi-
gent felony defendants annually, a problem of sufficient scope to merit more
attention than it has received in the past.
B. Standards of Indigency
The St. Louis County public defender begins to represent an indigent
defendant at his first appearance before a magistrate; in effect, therefore,
he decides whether a person is indigent when he interviews him shortly after
his arrest.13 In the other survey counties, the determination was made by
the circuit judge at the arraignment; 4 he questioned the defendant in open
court until satisfied of the latter's inability to hire counsel.55 This pattern
52. MISSOURI JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON CRIMIINAL CASES,
June 16, 1962-June 15, 1963. Potential errors introduced by using these figures:
(a) What the heading "Filed During Period" means varies from circuit clerk to
circuit clerk. Some clerks count each information as a separate case "filed during period,"
introducing a potential error each time more than one information is filed against one
person and each time more than one person is named in one information; these potential
errors are compensatory to some extent. Other clerks also count each information against
the same person as a separate case, but they count each person named in one indictment
as a separate case, thereby failing to introduce the compensation.
Some clerks count cases reversed and remanded by the supreme court under this head-
ing; others do not.
(b) Some misdemeanors inevitably will be included. Misdemeanor cases get into the
circuit courts in two ways, by appeal and on change of venue. Appeals from the magis-
trate courts go to the circuit courts, Mo. REv. STAT. § 478.070 (1959), where they are
tried de novo, § 512.270. In counties with only one magistrate, a change of venue goes
to the circuit court in that county. § 517.520; Mo. SuP. CT. R. CRIA. P. 22.05.
53. The procedure is described in Section II F infra.
54. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
55. Shortly before the survey, the judge in Audrain County began placing defendants
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seems to be established throughout Missouri, for all 24 judges responding to
the mail questionnaire checked the answer "I ask the defendant a series of
questions in open court" as being most nearly descriptive of his practice."8
A list of eight factors relevant to deciding whether a defendant is eligible
to have counsel appointed was given to all of the judges contacted, and
they were asked to check all of them they took into account in making their
decisions. The factors, with the number of judges checking each one, were:
(1) Salary or wages of accused: 33
(2) Ownership of automobile and other personal property: 29.
(3) Ownership of real property: 32.
(4) Stocks, bonds, and bank accounts: 30.
(5) Pensions, social security, and unemployment compensation: 24.
(6) Whether defendant is out on bail: 27.
(7) Financial resources of parents or spouse: 18, a number qualifying
"spouse" with phrases such as "if they are living together."
(8) Financial resources of other relatives: 11.
Disregarding two judges who did not answer, factor 1 was a unanimous
choice, and 3 was nearly so.
The judges then were asked to check all applicable answers to the ques-
tion, "Does any one of the following factors, standing alone, preclude a find-
ing of indigency?" Results were:
(1) Defendant is out on bail: 12.
(2) Defendant owns an automobile: 15, many writing in qualifications
such as "if he has sufficient equity," or "if it's not a piece of junk."
(3) Financial resources of parents are adequate: 3.
(4) Financial resources of spouse are adequate: 6, all of whom quali-
fied the answer with "if they are living together."
(5) Financial resources of other relatives are adequate: 1.
(6) Other: none.
No one factor precludes such a finding:57 10.
Among the 12 judges for whom release on bail precluded a finding of indi-
gency were those interviewed in four of the survey counties, the City of St.
under oath when questioning them about indigency. Other judges are known to be con-
sidering the use of oaths such as that of the voluntary bankrupt.
56. The 24 answers came from 23 circuits. See Section IV A infra for additional
details.
57. This is one of several poorly drafted questions that appeared on forms used in
the survey. Its defect is that the alternatives given do not cover the entire range of
possibilities. See the opening paragraph of Section IV infra. This alternative did not
appear on the form; I counted within it all judges who checked nothing (5) as well
as those who wrote in "no" or "none" (5).
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TABLE 13
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIGENCY AND BAIL
No Data about
Indigent Non-Indigent Indigency Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
County Cases Bail Cases Bail Cases Bail Cases Bail
Audrain 19 1 18 13 13 5 50 19
City of St. Louis 72 5a  63 47 9 0 144 52
Howell 3 0 3 1 14 2 20 3
Jackson 35 3 43 20 2 0 80 23
Jasper 11 1 31 21 8 1 50 23
Miller 4 0 10 5 4 3 18 8
Putnam 1 1 1 0 10 6 12 7
St. Louis 14 1 26 18 8 0 48 19
159 12 195 125 68 17 422 154
(.075) (.64) (.25) (.37)
a Includes three defendants whose bonds were cancelled after they had been released.
Louis, and Jackson, Jasper and St. Louis counties. Unlike those responding
by mail, these judges had an opportunity to qualify their answers. Most of
them distinguished between cash (or other negotiable security) bonds issued
by professional bondsmen, which precluded indigency, and property bonds
posted by relatives or other non-professionals, which did not.
A defendant who has been released on a professional bond in St. Louis
or St. Louis County, and who shows up at his arraignment without a lawyer,
is likely to have the bond revoked and be remanded to jail. Sometimes, in-
stead of revoking outright, the judge will set a date, usually well in advance
of the scheduled trial, by which time some lawyer must file a formal notice
of appearance for the defendant or the bond will be revoked. Requiring a
person to choose between his constitutional right to bail and his constitu-
tional right to a lawyer raises some difficult questions.
That there is a high correlation between release on bond and indigency
is demonstrated in Table 13. Only 7Y2 percent of the identifiable indigents
were released, as opposed to 64 percent of the identifiable non-indigents.
Cases in which it could not be determined whether identifiable indigents had
been released were so few (5 cases, or less than 3 percent) as to be in-
significant."8 There are, of course, at least two reasons besides lack of funds
58. It could not be determined whether defendant had been released in 13 (7 per-
cent) of the 195 studies of identifiable non-indigents, and in 28 (41 percent) of the
68 studies in which no data about indigency were available. If the 46 studies contain-
ing no data about release are ignored, the overall rate is 41 percent (154 releases in
376 studies) instead of the 37 percent shown in Table 13.
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why an indigent would not be set free: the crime is not bailable, and he has
decided to plead guilty at the first opportunity. Both of these are applicable
to the non-indigent too, however, and thus do not explain a difference in
release rates.
All prosecuting attorneys were asked, "How do you feel about the present
system for determining eligibility for free counsel?
"a. Too lenient
"b. Too strict
"c. About right."
No one thought it too strict. Of the 64 who answered by mail, 27 thought
it too lenient and 37 about right. Prosecutors in the survey counties split
evenly, 4 on each side. Overall, then, 41 of the 72 responding prosecutors,
a majority of 57 percent, thought the system satisfactory. But 43 percent
is not an insignificant proportion, and that so many should think the de-
termination of indigency too lenient suggests the need for further study.5 9
It became apparent during the survey that two judges who agreed com-
pletely on what factors ought to be considered, and what factors ought to
preclude eligibility, for free counsel might nevertheless disagree in specific
cases. The large measure of consensus in the generalities set out earlier
should not be misinterpreted to mean that the determination of indigency
is uniform throughout the state, or between different judges in the same
circuit.
The judges were asked, "If you find defendant is ineligible to have counsel
provided for him as an indigent, what happens then?" The alternatives
given, with the number of judges checking each (they were told to check
everything applicable), were:
(1) I tell the defendant that he is not eligible to have counsel provided
for him: 14.
(2) I tell the defendant he should retain his own lawyer if he wishes to
have a lawyer: 28.
(3) I ask the defendant if he knows a lawyer, and if he does not, I
appoint a lawyer for him who makes his own arrangements for a
fee: 1.
(4) I ask the defendant if he knows a lawyer, and if he does not, I
refer him to the local bar association or lawyer referral service for
assistance: 2.
(5) Other: 2.
59. Mail questionnaires sent to defense attorneys did not inquire about this specific
problem. Nevertheless, asked for their opinions about the present system, three lawyers
wrote in recommendations for stricter determinations of indigency.
Suspicions that determinations were too lenient prompted the move towards the use
of oaths described in note 55 supra.
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One of the judges who checked "other" gave the defendant a list of attorneys
"who are available for criminal trials"; this judge had also marked alterna-
fives 1 and 2. The other judge, who had marked none of the first four al-
ternatives, said that he appointed an attorney if the defendant did not hire
one whether or not he was indigent.
C. Appointed Counsel
In the rural counties surveyed, the system of selecting appointed counsel
reflected the judge's effort to distribute appointments evenly among the
lawyers. Since they knew all of the lawyers practicing in their circuits, they
usually relied upon their memories to do this. Sometimes there was no
choice: Putnam County had only one lawyer besides the prosecuting at-
torney; Miller County had only three. Although none appeared in the
survey sample, there are counties in Missouri where the prosecutor is the
only lawyer; in such cases, the reporters were told, the judges attempted to
spread appointments among lawyers practicing in nearby counties that are
part of their circuits. The judge in Audrain County kept a detailed record
of appointments, containing such things as the seriousness of the crime and
the disposition of the case (whether by plea or trial, etc.) to which he in-
variably referred when making new appointments.
In the urban and suburban survey counties, where it was a practical
impossibility for the judges to know all of the lawyers, the reporters failed
to discover anything that could be glorified by the name "system." One
judge took note of bar association officers who made speeches about the
obligations of lawyers and appointed them. Another kept a file of calling
cards given him by recently-admitted members of the bar. Another selected
lawyers in alphabetical order as they appeared in the yellow pages of the
telephone directory. In January, 1963, the assignment division in the City
of St. Louis began keeping a record of appointments in an effort to distri-
bute them evenly,6" but its usefulness as a tool of selection, as opposed to
disqualification, is doubtful.
It is with these grains of salt that the judges' answers to the question,
"What system do you use for providing lawyers to appoint in ordinary
felony cases?" must be taken. Nine alternative answers were given, but the
responses from Missouri were limited to four of them."' They were:
60. At the time, the City public defender represented only first offenders. See Section
II F infra. Attorneys for other indigents were appointed by the court.
61. Except for the last alternative, "Other." The three answers in this category are
set out in the preceding paragraph of the text.
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(1) Bar association list of names: 2.
(2) Any attorney present in court: 3.
(3) Judge's own list of names: 10.
(4) Roster of all attorneys admitted to practice, subject to exceptions
for age, infirmity, state agency employment, etc.: 19.
Of the 57 defense attorneys who returned questionnaires, 28, or nearly half,
checked the answer "Improve the system which the judge uses in selecting
lawyers to be appointed" when asked "What changes, if any, would you
recommend?" 2 The two gripes voiced most often by these 28 were
that appointments fell upon too few lawyers, and recently-admitted and in-
experienced attorneys were appointed too frequently.
A separate question asked, "Do you have a special system for very serious
cases, such as crimes punishable by death or a long prison sentence?" No
answers were provided to this question; the judges had to write their own.
Seven replied yes, 11 no. Ten said they appointed the best lawyer available;
seven said they appointed two lawyers in such cases.
Responses to the question, "Do you have a problem in getting lawyers to
serve as assigned counsel?" broke down as follows:
No
Yes No Answer
Judges interviewed 1 10 0
Judges replying by mail 2 20 2
The ratio of no to yes answers was the same in both categories, 10 to 1.
However, when asked, "What percentage ask to be excused?" the answers
were:
None 1% to 9%
Judges interviewed 1 10
Judges replying by mail 12 12
Replies to the question "What is your policy with lawyers who ask to be ex-
cused?" fell into two principal groups. The substance of replies in the
larger group was, "I ask why, and if he has a legitimate reason, I excuse
him." The thrust of answers in the other group was, "I excuse him because
he won't do a good job if I force the appointment on him."
One might speculate that the results of this series of answers might have
been less cheerful had more judges been interviewed and fewer sent ques-
tionnaires. Nevertheless, they were surprisingly optimistic in view of the fact
that appointed lawyers in Missouri are not even repaid the expenses in-
curred in defending their indigent clients. Defense attorneys were asked,
62. See Section IV C infra for limitations on the statistical validity of defense attorney
questionnaires.
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concerning the last case in which they had been appointed in 1962, "How
much would you have charged a client who retained you for your services
in this case?"6 The figures written in by the 48 lawyers responding fell into
this arrangement:
less than $250 ........................... 5
$250 to $499 ............................ 9
$500 to $999 --------------------------- 16
$1,000 or more ............................ 18
The largest figure was $25,000, the smallest $100. The total of all figures
given was $68,000, an average of $1,412.50 per lawyer responding.
In one survey county, the judge made payment of the appointed lawyer a
condition of probation. In another, the judge informed prospective proba-
tioners that he thinks payment of the lawyer is a clear indication of a will-
ingness to accept responsibility; he also required probationers to report to
him periodically and never failed to ask whether they had paid their at-
torneys. In a third, the judge urged defendants to pay their lawyers when
he put them on probation. It was permissible for the appointed attorney to
obtain whatever fee he could from his "indigent" client in all of the survey
counties except Putnam.
D. Waiver
Indigents were not permitted to waive appointment of attorneys in seven
of the eight survey counties.64 Six judges answering mail questionnaires also
indicated that they do not permit waiver in their circuits. According to
figures released by the Judicial Conference,6 58 percent of the felonies
committed in the state during fiscal 1963 occurred in these areas. Roughly
40 percent of Missouri's indigent defendants, therefore, can waive their
right to an attorney, and the problem is to determine how many of them
actually do so.
The estimates of the 18 judges responding by mail who permit waiver were
distributed as follows:
24 percent or less ....................... 5
25 to 49 percent ...........................4
50 to 74 percent ........................... 4
75 percent or more ....................... 4G
63. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not ask how that case had been disposed
of (by plea, trial, etc.), nor did it ask what services the lawyer had rendered. See the
opening paragraph of Section IV infra.
64. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. MissouRI JUDicrAL CONFERENCE, CONSOLMATED REPORT ON CRIMINAL CASES,
June 16, 1962-June 15, 1963. These calculations are subject to the same infirmities men-
tioned in note 52 supra.
66. Two judges from the same circuit answered; their estimates (which differed by
15 percent) were averaged and counted only once.
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Their average estimate was 38.6 percent. Among the prosecuting attorneys,
13 said that waiver was not permitted, and another 13 answered "zero"
when asked to estimate the number of indigents who waived appointment.
The remaining 42 questionnaires divided this way:
24 percent or less -------------------------- 16
25 to 49 percent ------------------------------ 6
50 to 74 percent ----------------------- 11
75 percent or more -------------------------- 6
No answer -------------------------------------- 3
Although the prosecutors were spread among the categories less evenly,
their average estimate, 33.9 percent, was within 5 points of the judges'.
Pyramiding these guesses on top of the guess that Missouri has ap-
proximately 4,000 indigent felony defendants a year, I "estimate" that
somewhere in the neighborhood of 600 felony defendants annually waive
their right to appointed counsel.
E. Time of Appointment
In June, 1963, Missouri's attorney general rendered an opinion stating
that magistrates had the power to appoint attorneys for indigent defen-
dants."' Many magistrates had believed until then that they had no such
authority, perhaps because many of them were laymen.8 Whatever the
reason, the inevitable result was that lawyers were not appointed until the
indigent felony defendants appeared in circuit court, usually for arraign-
ment."' Defense lawyers were asked to specify, with respect to the last case
in which they were appointed in 1962, at what stage of the proceeding they
had been appointed. The 49 answers received were as follows:
70
67. Mo. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 207, June 21, 1963. The opinion dealt only with the
question of appointing lawyers for indigents accused of misdemeanors, but its relevance
is obvious.
68. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
69. Two committees, one appointed by the Missouri Supreme Court, the other or-
ganized by the President of the Missouri Bar, are now investigating problems of the
defense of indigents. Many magistrates seem content to await action by these com-
mittees before beginning to make appointments. It is impossible to determine how many
magistrates have already begun taking action, although it is known that five have. What
changes, if any, will result from the activities of the two committees cannot be foretold
at this time.
70. No one selected any of the first three possible answers. Eight of the 57 lawyers
who responded to this questionnaire had not been appointed in 1962, and hence did not
answer this question.
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(4) At preliminary hearing: 3.
(5) After preliminary hearing but before the filing of an indictment,
information, etc.: 2.
(6) After the filing of an indictment, information, etc. but before
arraignment thereon: 6.
(7) At arraignment: 9.
(8) After arraignment, but before trial: 28.
(9) At trial: 1.
Only five clearly were appointed before the arraignment. The significance of
answer number 6 is debatable. When an unrepresented defendant appears
for arraignment, the judge, not infrequently, will appoint a lawyer who
happens to be in the courtroom and ask him to confer with the defendant
immediately, perhaps in the jury room. The conference may last as long as
30 minutes, at which time the defendant will be arraigned. Such a course
of events, which could come within the terms of answer 6, is indistinguish-
able from an appointment at the arraignment.
At the time of the survey, the first contact between the City of St. Louis's
public defender and an indigent felony defendant came at the pre-arraignz
ment conference, except for a brief interview conducted in the jail. Since
that time, however, the public defender has begun representing indigents
at their first appearance in the Court of Criminal Correction. One of the
defenders told me not long ago that the result has been to reduce the number
of preliminary hearings. "Once I explain to them what the preliminary is
for, they waive it," he said.71 Since the establishment of his office last year,
the St. Louis County public defender has always represented defendants from
the time they first appear before a magistrate.
F. Public Defenders
The City of St. Louis Public Defender Bureau was created in 1938 by
city ordinance."2 The Bureau's office is located in the Municipal Courts
Building, which also houses the circuit court, the Court of Criminal Cor-
rection, the circuit attorney, and the probation and parole officer. The
office is furnished with a few ancient desks and office chairs, an unup-
holstered bench in the waiting room, some decrepit file cabinets, one manual
typewriter and an obsolete dictaphone that has not worked in years. Its i-
71. Defendants no longer enter a plea, either. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"I tell them, 'Don't say anything about guilt in there. Just say you waive your pre-
liminary,'" my informant said.
72. ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE § 186.010 (1960). The ordinance was recently
amended in two important respects. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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brary consists of a set of the Missouri Revised Statutes, requisitioned by
moonlight from another office, and a subscription to Popular Science maga-
zine contributed by some public benefactor. To maintain these lavish
surroundings in their customary splendor, to supplement the library, and
to pay normal office expenses, the City appropriates a handsome $300 an-
nually. The state contributes nothing.
The remainder of the Bureau's annual budget, $29,505, pays the salaries
of the three lawyers, including the director, and a stenographer-clerk. The
director is also the director of the Legal Aid Society. The Bureau has no
funds for investigation. The extent to which the circuit attorney's office
compensates for this lack by revealing information it has obtained depends
upon whether you ask the public defender or the circuit attorney. The latter
does permit the defender unlimited use of his library, however.
During the fiscal year ending March 31, 1963, the Bureau handled the
cases of 714 indigents to conclusion.7" Dividing the Bureau's annual budget
by this figure indicates that the City spent an average of $41.75 per com-
pleted case.
At the time of the survey, the defender was authorized to represent only
(a) first offenders (b) accused of felonies. A few months ago, however, the
ordinance was amended to eliminate both of these restrictions, and to add
new authority:
The functions of the Public Defender Bureau shall be (1) to provide
legal services for any poor person . . . accused of committing a state
felony or state misdemeanor... (3) ... at all stages of the proceeding
necessary fully to advise and protect any such poor person .... "
The defender has begun entering cases at the initial appearances in the
Court of Criminal Correction as a result of the latter provision. At the time
of this writing, procedures for representing indigents accused of misde-
meanors, and for handling the inevitable increase caused by lifting the
first-offender limitation, had not been crystallized.
Even when the first-offender limitation was in effect, the defender did
73. The breakdown of salaries is
Director $10,000.00
Assistant Director 8,228.00
Attorney 6,224.00
Stenographer 5,053.00
74. ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE §§ 186.020-.030 (1960).
75. 1962-1963 [ST. Louis, Mo.] PUBLic DEFENDER BUREAU ANN. REP. 3.
76. Board Bill No. 75 (1964), amending ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE § 186.010
(1960), which provided in part:
The functions of the Public Defender Bureau shall be to provide legal services
for any poor person accused of committing a felony, who has not previously been
convicted of a felony ....
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represent some multiple-offenders. Sometimes the court appointed the
Bureau. Much more numerous, however, were the defendants who decided
at the pre-arraignment conference or earlier to plead guilty at their arraign-
ments; the defender represented most of them, whether or not they had prior
convictions.
The circuit attorney furnishes the Bureau with the names of and charges
against all persons jailed on felonies. Sometime before his arraignment, each
such person is interviewed by one of the defenders and, if he qualifies for
assistance, a brief form is completed about him. In addition to requesting
vital statistics about the defendant, his father, mother, sisters, brothers,
spouse and children, the form asks for such things as date of arrest, prior
arrests, "Court Record," the defendant's church and pastor, his employers'
names and addresses, and three character references. If any useful informa-
tion is obtained, it is written into the four inch blank space at the bottom
entitled "Remarks." The defender who conducts the pre-arraignment con-
ferences has before him these forms and the typewritten list prepared by the
circuit attorney.
At the weekly arraignment in circuit court, the defender enters a formal
appearance for all defendants who qualify for his assistance 7 and for all
those who have decided to plead guilty. He requests the court to appoint
lawyers- for the other defendants who are unable to hire them.
The St. Louis County Division of Public Defender was established by
county ordinance on January 1, 1963.78 Its offices are located in the same
building as the circuit court, the prosecuting attorney, and the probation and
parole officer. Some magistrates are, some are not, located there. Furnishings
are new and adequate. The library contains the Southwestern Reporter,
Missouri Digest, Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes, and a few miscel-
laneous volumes. The office is manned by two attorneys, including the di-
rector, neither of whom engages in outside activities, and a stenographer-
clerk. It was recommended that a salaried investigator be part of the de-
fender's staff at the time the County Council was deliberating creation of
the division. The recommendation was not followed, however, and no
investigator has yet been added. But the division does have an annual
budget allotment of $1,200 for "analytical and evidence expenses," from
which deposition expenses and expert witness fees are paid.
Unlike the City defender, the County defender has never been restricted
to first offenders; instead, he is required to
77. As determined by the judge in the procedure described in Section II B supra.
78. ST. Louis COUNTY, Mo., REv. ORINANCES § 606.100 (1958).
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Provide counsel for every indigent person unable to employ counsel
who faces the possibility of the deprivation of his liberty for a period of
more than one year .... 11
As a result, the County defender represented 29 juvenile offenders and 88
persons subjected to civil proceedings for commitment of the mentally ill,
in addition to 152 felony defendants, during his first year of operation. If
this total case load of 274 is divided into an annual budget of $30,300,8o to
which the state contributes nothing, the quotient indicates the County spent
an average of $110.60 per case.
Every day one of the defenders secures from the prosecuting attorney a
list of persons against whom felony warrants were issued. This list is taken
to the sheriff's office and those persons who have made bond are scratched
off. Those remaining on the list will be interviewed in the jail before their
initial appearance, a procedure made possible by the fact that initial ap-
pearances normally are conducted only two days a week. 8 If the defender
decides a prisoner is indigent, he requires him to sign a form stating, among
other things, that he is "wholly without funds and unable to employ coun-
sel." The form has the appearance of an affidavit, but is neither sworn to
nor notarized. He also completes a data sheet which, besides vital statis-
tics, asks only for the charge, prior record, and a resume of the present
charge.
79. Ibid.
80. This figure is the total 1964 budget. I used it rather than the 1963 figure because
the latter contained some non-recurring items, such as office furniture. The breakdown of
the 1963 budget was:
Salaries $24,252.00
Printing and binding 1,500.00
Postage (special only) 10.00
Telephone 360.00
Travel and transportation 700.00
Office maintenance 100.00
Analytical and evidence 1,200.00
Supplies 500.00
Miscellaneous 50.00
Subscriptions and memberships 2,070.00
Office equipment 4,300.00
$35,042.00
The item for office equipment was eliminated from the 1964 budget; that for "subscrip.
tions and memberships," from which the basic library had been purchased in 1963, was
reduced to $500. On the other hand, "travel and transportation" was increased to $1,200.
There were a few other minor changes.
81. See text accompanying note I I supra.
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The ordinance creating his office requires the defender to
Come into operation at a sufficiently early stage of the proceedings
so as to fully advise and protect the defendant ... 8
At a meeting with the circuit judges during 1963, the defender argued that
this required him to appear before the preliminary hearing. This in turn,
he contended, meant that he was going to have to make the determination
of indigency at the time he interviewed the defendant in jail. The judges
agreed. The result is that the County defender appears for the indigent de-
fendant at every stage of the proceeding beginning with the initial ap-
pearance before a magistrate. The defender and the prosecuting attorney
have agreed that all preliminary hearings should be transcribed. Each of-
fice furnishes a stenographer to perform the task alternately, and a free copy
of the transcript is provided the other office.
G. Bail
The high degree of correlation between whether a defendant was re-
leased on bail and whether he was determined to be indigent is revealed in
Table 13, set out earlier. Nevertheless, some indigents are released on bond.
One explanation for this is that the premium was so low the judge did not
feel it should influence him. Another is that the bond was posted by a rela-
tive or friend. There were no professional bondsmen in a number of the
survey counties; in two of these the reporters were told that most lawyers
had wealthy clients who were willing to post bonds on behalf of indigents
they represented. A third is that the defendant was released on his own
recognizance, that is, his promise to return. In the rural survey counties,
defendants were released regularly, but not frequently, on their own re-
cognizances. These releases were motivated partly by a hope that the de-
fendant would be able to work during the period and pay his appointed
lawyer some fee. In one survey county, the judge said he regularly passed
cases from one term to the next, at the request of lawyers, to give indigents
time to accumulate more money.
The first systematic program in Missouri for the release of defendants on
their own recognizances was begun in the City of St. Louis in 1963, too late
to be reflected in the docket studies. However, since Attorney General
Robert Kennedy's recent national conference on bail has focused so much
attention on the problem, and because it is so intimately connected with the
defense of indigents, I thought it worthwhile to include some statistics
82. ST. Louis COUNTY, Mo., REv. ORDINANCES § 606.100 (1958).
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on the program." Preliminarily, it should be stressed that defendants are
not released on recognizance unless the probation and parole officer rec-
ommends it, and recommendations are forthcoming only after careful screen-
ing. These are not, in other words, randomly sampled defendants, and hence
the statistics which follow are not comparable to any others reported in this
study.8
From February 14 to December 31, 1963, 71 defendants were released
on recognizance, 5 and 12 were denied release. Ultimate dispositions were:
Not Still
Guilty Guilty Pending
Released 3 68 0
Not released 2 9 1
Sentences of those who were guilty were:
Probation or
Jail Fine Bench Parole
Released 6 2 60
Not released 4 0 5
Had they not been released, these 71 defendants would have spent an
average of 48 days in jail awaiting dispositions of their cases.
H. Sentencing and Appeals
Attorneys appointed to represent defendants who plead guilty were uni-
formly expected to be present at the sentencing in the eight survey counties.
The same was true for those who had represented defendants convicted
83. I am indebted to Charles Mann, Chief Probation and Parole Officer of the Circuit
Court for Criminal Causes (the name given the divisions of the circuit court processing
criminal matters in the City) for these figures.
84. Release was recommended for 83 defendants out of a total of 1,469 warrants
issued during the same period.
85. The types of offenses charged against defendants who were released were:
Burglary 2d degree 32
Stealing over $50 20
Car theft 6
Establishing a lottery 3
Carrying concealed weapon 2
Robbery 2
Assault 1
Forgery 1
Mistreating a child 1
Murder 2d degree 1
Rape 1
Sodomy 1
71
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after trials. The two public defenders attend all sentencings of persons they
have represented.
Until recently, Missouri had an unusual method of handling indigent ap-
peals. Appeals from felony convictions go directly to the supreme court, by-
passing the courts of appeal."0 As part of his duties, the lawyer who repre-
sented defendant at his trial was expected to file a motion for new trial in
the circuit court. An indigent wishing to appeal could do so by notifying
the supreme court of his desire. For this purpose he was given a free trial
transcript. That court read the transcript, reviewing all questions preserved
in the motion for new trial." Effective March 1, 1964, however, the su-
preme court rule has been amended to require the trial court to appoint an
attorney to represent an indigent appellant; "such counsel may, in the discre-
tion of the court, be the same counsel who represented the defendant at the
trial or other counsel.""8 The County public defender thus far has carried
his own cases on appeal. The City defender has heretofore terminated his
services after the sentencing.
I. Miscellaneous Matters
None of the sample counties had appointed attorneys for indigents accused
of misdemeanors at the time of the survey. A recent opinion by Missouri's
attorney general, however, stated that "counsel must be appointed in all mis-
demeanor cases of more than minor significance and in all cases where preju-
dice might result."8 9 It is known that magistrates in at least five counties
have been making appointments since then, but it was impossible to deter-
mine how widespread the practice is.
Problems associated with habeas corpus and other post-conviction
remedies are largely confined to Cole County, the location of the peniten-
tiary. Since this was not a sample county, very little data about these prob-
lems were collected.
III. COMPARISONS BETWEEN INDIGENTS AND NON-INDIGENTS
Presumably, all the measures described in Section II were devised for the
purpose of giving the indigent the same quantity and quality of protection
86. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3.
87. The procedure is described in State v. Bosler, 366 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1963),
which rejected the contention that it had been made unconstitutional by Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
88. Mo. Sup. OT. R. Crxw. P. 29.01 as printed in 19 J. Mo. B. 439-40 (1963). A
footnote appended to the amendment, apparently by the court, reads
It is suggested that in all multiple-judge circuits the court should compile and
keep a panel or docket of available counsel from which all appointments shall be
made, in order not to impose unduly upon any individual or firm.
89. Mo. ATr'Y. GEN. Op. No. 207, June 21, 1963.
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TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF GUILT DETERMINATIONS:
BAIL AND NOT RELEASEDa
Without All
Trial Dispositions
No. No. % No. No. %
County Cases Guilty Guilty Cases Guilty Guilty
Audrian-bail ......................................... 17 10 59 19 10 53
-not released ....................................... 24 22 92 28 22 88
City of St. Louis-bail .............................. 45 41 91 51 44 86
-not released ............................ . ....... 76 75 99 84 80 95
Howell-bail ............... 3 2 67 3 2 67
- not released ...................................... 10 6 60 10 6 60
Jackson-bail .......................................... 22 6 27 23 6 26
-not released ............... 47 33 70 54 36 67
Jasper-bail ................ 15 12 80 21 14 67
- not released ........................................ 16 13 81 17 14 82
Miller-bail ................. 4 2 50 4 2 50
-not released ............... 7 6 86 7 6 86
Putnam- bail ............................................ 6 5 83 7 6 86
-not released ............. 3 3 100 3 3 100
St. Louis-bail ............... 18 18 100 19 19 100
-not released .................. 19 17 90 20 18 90
Total-bail .................... 130 96 74 147 103 70
-not released ....................................... 202 175 86 223 185 83
a Cases in which no data about bail were available, and cases not finally disposed of,
are omitted. Hence the figures in the "number of cases" columns may vary from those
found in Tables 9, 12, 13 and 15.
as the non-indigent claims by right. Hence one standard of their effective-
ness ought to be the extent to which the results reached in cases involving
different classes of defendants are the same. If this be the standard, Missouri
falls short of it.
Table 14 compares the conviction rates of defendants released on bail
with those of defendants not released." The difference was a staggering 43
percentage points for Jackson County in pre-trial dispositions, and 41 points
overall. Audrain County, the only one that permitted defendants to waive
90. Release on bail rather than indigency was selected to make the comparison for a
number of reasons, the most important being that data were more uniformly available
throughout the survey counties. Besides, Table 13, and Tables 15 and 16 together,
indicate that the results would not have been appreciably different.
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TABLF 15
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES BETWEEN DEFENDANTS RELEASED
AND DEFENDANTS NOT RELEASED ON BAIL'
Not Released
Prob.,
Bench
Prison Fine Parole
22 12
(.55)
80 69
(.86)
6 5
(.83)
36 29
(.81)
14 10
(.71)
6 3
(.50)
3 1
(.33)
18 12
(.66)
185 141
(.76)
(.1
(.1
(.1
6 4
27) (.18)
0 11
(.14)
0 1
(.17)
0 7
(.19)
1 3
07) (.22)
0 3
(.50)
1 1
33) (.33)
1 5b
06) (.28)
9 35
05) (.19)
No.
Cases
Released
Prob.,
Bench
Prison Fine Parole
10 3
(.30)
43 16
(.37)
2 0
6 2
(.33)
14 5
(.36)
1 0
County
Audrain
City of
St. Louis
Howell
Jackson
jasper
Miller
Putnam
St. Louis
1
(.10)
7
(.16)
0
1
(.17)
2
(.14)
0
3
(.50)
0
14
(.14)
6
(.60)
20
(.46)
2
(1.0)
3
(.50)
7
(.50)
1
(1.0)
1
(.17)
10
(.53)
50
(.50)
a Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b Includes the only discovered instance in which defendant's sentence was suspended
without probation. This is rare in Missouri. See Section I D.
appointments, had differences of 33 and 35 points.9 ' The difference between
rates for all counties in all dispositions was 13 points.
The next two tables compare the types of sentences assessed against per-
sons released on bail with those not released (Table 15) and against in-
digents with non-indigents (Table 16). They show that the indigent de-
fendant not released on bail was about twice as likely to be sent to prison,
one-third as likely to be let off with a fine, and one-third as likely to be put
on probation, as his counterpart.
How can figures as unsettling as these be explained? One possibility is that
the lawyers appointed for indigents are not doing their jobs. All judges were
91. Miller County is being ignored because some might think the data insufficient.
No.
Cases
6 2
(.33)
19 9
(.47)
.01 37
(.37)
1
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TABLz 16
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES BETWEEN
INDIGENTS AND NON-INDIGENTS3
Indigent Non-Indigent
Prob., Prob.,
No. Bench No. Bench
County Cases Prison Fine Parole Cases Prison Fine Parole
Audrain 18 11 4 3 14 4 4 6
(.61) (.22) (.17) (.29) (.29) (.43)
City of 69 61 0 8 55 26 7 22
St. Louis (.88) (.12) (.47) (.13) (.40)
Howellb 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.0)
Jackson 25 19 0 6 18 12 1 5
(.76) (.24) (.67) (.06) (.27)
Jasper 11 8 0 3 18 8 2 8
(.75) (.27) (.44) (.11) (.44)
Miller 4 3 0 1 6 1 0 5
(.75) (.25) (.17) (.83)
Putnam 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
(1.0) (1.0)
St. Louis 14 10 0 4c 24 12 1 11
(.71) (.29) (.50) (.04) (.46)
144 115 4 25 136 63 15 58
(.80) (.03) (.17) (.46) (.11) (.43)
•Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b So little data about indigency were available in Howell (6 of 20 cases) and Putnam
(2 of 12 cases) that conclusions with respect to these counties would be little more than
guesses.
a Includes the only discovered instance in which defendant's sentence was suspended
and he was excused from probation. This rarely happens in Missouri. See Section I D.
asked, "How do you think appointed lawyers compare in experience and
ability with lawyers retained by defendants?" The results were:
Better
Too few lawyers to make a difference
Equal
Not as good
No answer
Judges
Replying
by Mail
3
6
10
1
4
Judges
Interviewed
0
2
8
1
0
Total
3
8
18
2
4
11 35Total
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Asked the same questions, prosecuting attorneys answered as follows:
Prosecutors
Replying Prosecutors
by Mail Interviewed Total
Better 4 0 4
Too few lawyers to make a difference 9 0 9
Equal 38 7 45
Not as good 5 1 6
No answer 12 0 12
Total 68 8 76
The judges were also asked, "How do you think appointed lawyers compate
in experience and ability with the district attorney?" Their answers were:
Judges
Replying Judges
by Mail Interviewed Total
Better 6 2 8
Equal 16 9 25
Not as good 0 0 0
No answer 2 0 2
Total 24 11 35
What these figures do not reveal is that many of the persons who rated the
appointed lawyers at least equal to the retained lawyers and the prosecuting
attorneys modified their answers with such comments as "lack of enthusi-
asm," "subconsciously, he won't try as hard," "can't afford to spend the time
he would if he were being paid," and others of similar import.
The significance of these qualifications lies in the fact that the questions
were asked in terms of "experience and ability," not in terms of effectiveness.
No great discrepancy in experience was uncovered between defense lawyers
and prosecutors by the mail questionnaires. Defense lawyers were asked the
number of years they had been practicing; 38 had been in practice 6 years
or longer, 19 less, a ratio of 2 to 1.92 Prosecutors were asked the number of
years they had served as prosecuting or assistant prosecuting attorneys.
Exactly half of the 76 from whom information was obtained had 5 years or
more experience, the other half had less. Defense attorneys were also asked
to "state your experience in criminal practice before the first case in which
you-were appointed in 1962." Eight of the 57 returning questionnaires had
92. See Section IV C infra for limitations on the statistical validity of these ques-
tionnaires.
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TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF DISPOSITIONS IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
BY TYPE OF ATTORNEYa
Non-Jury Jury
Without Trial Trial Trial
P/G P/G Not
Type of No. Nol. Dis- Prin. Lesser Disp.
Counsel Cases Pros. missal Off. Off. G N/G G N/G of
Retained 63 4b 1 38 13 1 0 3c  2 1
(.06) (.02) (.60) (.21)
Assigned 18 1 0 13 1 0 0 2 1 0
(.06) (.72) (.06)
Publ. Def. 54 0 0 47 5 0 0 1 ld 0
(.87) (.09)
Unspecified 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
No Data 6 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
144 9 3 99 20 1 0 7 4 1
(.06) (.02) (.69) (.14)
a Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b Includes one abated by death.
c Includes one guilty of lesser offense.
d By reason of insanity.
not been appointed in 1962, and did not reply; answers of the remaining 49
broke down like this:
None .............................................. 5
1 to 4 cases .................................... 8
5 to 9 cases .................................... 5
10 to 19 cases .................................. 6
20 to 49 cases ................................. .4
50 cases or more ....................... 21
More than half had had 20 or more cases. The point is not that assigned
lawyers were more experienced than prosecutors, or vice versa. The figures
simply suggest that there was no discrepancy between the two large enough
to account for the gross inequality of treatment between indigents and non-
indigents.
All three classes of defense lawyers, retained, assigned and public de-
fender, function within the City of St. Louis. Table 17 compares the dis-
position of the City's 144 docket studies by type of attorney. Defendants
represented by retained lawyers pleaded guilty to the principal offense
charged 60 percent, those represented by appointed attorneys 72 percent,
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TAsLE 18
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
BY TYPE OF ATTORNEY"
No Not
Type of No. Con- Pro- Bench Disp.
Counsel Cases victionb Prison Fine bation Parole of
Retained 63 7 26 7 8 14 1
(.11) (.41) (.11) (.13) (.22) (.02)
Assigned 18 2 15 0 1 0 0
(.11) (.83) (.06)
Pub. Def. 54 1 46 0 0 7 0
(.02) (.85) (.13)
Unspecified 3 2 0 0 1 0 0
No Data 6 4 1 0 0 0 1
e
144 16 88 7 10 21 2
(.11) (.61) (.05) (.07) (.14) (.01)
a Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
b All cases in which no conviction resulted.
C Guilty, but not sentenced.
and those by the public defender 87 percent of the time.13 The retained
lawyers' success in getting charges reduced in exchange for pleas, 21 percent,
was more than twice that of the public defender, and more than three times
that of the appointed lawyers. Since two of the three defenders have been
practicing more than 15 years, lack of experience obviously is not the answer
to different treatment in the City.
Table 18 discloses that retained lawyers held their advantage over the
other classes in securing lighter sentences for their clients. They were able
to secure no-prison sentences in 46 percent of their cases, more than three
times the rate of success of the public defender-although the defender
represents many first-offenders, and almost eight times that of appointed
attorneys.
But why should the type of attorney make a difference in whether the
defendant is placed on probation; is not that a decision made by the judge
and the probation officer? My guess, which is based only on an impression
picked up in the course of the survey, is that the answer is twofold. First,
judges normally do not place defendants on probation unless someone asks
93. Two things help explain the very high proportion of guilty pleas in cases handled
by the public defender. One is that the pre-arraignment conference funnels an unusually
large number of them to him. The other is the Director's attitude about guilty pleas:
As may be observed in this Report, the great majority of the cases handled by this
Bureau were disposed of at arraignment by a plea of guilty. This procedure has
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them to. Second, appointed lawyers do not ask. Even though they were re-
quired to be present at the sentencing in the eight survey counties, appointed
lawyers generally seemed to view their obligation as being only that of pro-
tecting the indigent against an improper determination of guilt.
IV. WHAT THE MIssouRi BAR THINKS
The survey had two goals. One was to learn how the criminal process ac-
tually functioned with respect to indigent persons accused of crime. The
second was to canvass the opinions of judges, prosecuting attorneys and de-
fense lawyers about the process they administer. Many of these opinions
were gathered in interviews, but most of them came from mail question-
naires. It may as well be admitted that the results were not entirely satis-
factory. So much attention was devoted to designing questions suitable at
the same time for different state procedures but uniform reporting that some
defects went unnoticed.9 Such oversights were rare, fortunately, and some
of them are probably insignificant. Nonetheless, I have called attention to
all of them.
A. Judges
There are 85 circuit judges in Missouri, 46 of whom sit in the eight survey
counties. Eleven of these 46 were interviewed.95 Thirty-five of the 39
judges sitting in non-survey counties were sent questionnaires." Replies
were received from 24 judges, a response rate of 69 percent, sitting in 23
circuits. Altogether, therefore, information was received from 35, or 41
percent, of the 85 judges. Fourteen of the 35 had more than 10 years ser-
vice on the circuit bench, the others less. Ten of them sat in circuits con-
been found to have a manifold benefit. Firstly, and certainly foremost, has been
the interest of the defendant in each individual case. When the defendant has
made an admission of guilt and has expressed a desire to enter a plea of guilty, a
consultation is held with the Assistant Circuit Attorney . . . and the case dis-
posed of promptly. In this manner, a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial (or disposition) is fully protected. Secondly, the burden and expenditure
of tax money on maintaining persons for a long period of time is greatly reduced.
Furthermore, the personnel of the Bureau attempt, at all times when trial by
Jury is indicated, to be ready at the first setting of the case.
1961-1962 [ST. Louis, Mo.] PuBLIc DEFENDER BUREAU ANN. REP. 3.
94. Each of the following flaws appeared at least once: the question was confusing;
it was drafted in such a manner, or against such a background, that even a "yes?' or
"no" answer was ambiguous; a multiple choice answer did not offer a full range of
possibilities; questions intended to be identical appeared in one form on the mail ques-
tionnaire and in a different form on the interview sheet.
95. An attempt was made to interview at least two judges in multi-judge circuits-
the senior judge and the judge then currently assigned to the criminal division.
96. Questionnaires normally were sent only to the senior judge of a multi-judge circuit.
In one instance they were sent to two judges, both of whom replied.
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taining only one county, a rough, but reasonably accurate, way of separating
urban from rural communities. The 35 judges represented 31, or 72 per-
cent, of the 43 circuits. In fiscal 1963, 84 percent of all felony filings oc-
curred in these 31 circuits.9 7
The judges were asked, "Under an ideal 8 system, at what stage in a
criminal case do you think a lawyer should first be made available to the
indigent person?"99 Twenty-six thought the lawyer should be provided
earlier than he is at present, which is at the arraignment, and 21 of these
thought this should occur no later than the first appearance."' 0 Eight judges
thought the present practice satisfactory. One did not answer.
The second part of the question was, "Do you think it is unfair to the in-
digent person if he does not get a lawyer at this stage?" The answers split
like this:
Favoring Present
Earlier Practice
Appointments Satisfactory
Yes 9 5
Not necessarily 4 0
Don't know 3 0
No 7 2
No answer 3 1
The next question was, "Do you think that such a system could be
financed?"' 1 Of the 26 favoring earlier appointments, 13 thought it could
be, 6 that it could not, 3 did not know, and 4 did not answer. Many, includ-
ing some who said yes, doubted that the counties could finance earlier ap-
pointments without state aid. The significance of these replies is impossible
97. A total of 9,167 cases was filed throughout the state, 7,737 of them in the 31
circuits whose judges were contacted. MISsouRI JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CONSOLIDATED
REPORT ON CRIMINAL CASES, June 16, 1962-June 15, 1963.
98. The word "ideal" appeared in two questions asked of both judges and prosecu-
tom, and it may have confused a few of them. The first part of both questions asked,
"Under an ideal system" should an indigent get such-and-such? And the second part
asked, "Do you think it is unfair" if he doesn't get it? A few judges and a few prose-
cutors pointed out that if "ideal" is given its classical meaning, the answer to the "un-
fairness" part of the question would have to be yes by definition.
99. This was how the question appeared on the mail questionnaires. Judges who
were interviewed (11 of the 35) were asked, "Under an ideal system, at what stage in
a criminal case do you think the indigent person should first be provided with a lawyer
if he wants one?" (Emphasis added.)
100. Between arrest and first appearance-7; at first appearance-14; before pre-
liminary hearing-2. One judge each voted for the following three choices: at pre-
liminary hearing; after preliminary but before filing of the information or indictment;
after filing but before arraignment.
101. Those interviewed were asked, "What do you think about the problem of
financing such a system?"
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to assess. If Missouri continues to pay appointed attorneys neither fees nor
expenses, what additional cost would there be? Did those who answered yes
assume the present practice would be continued, or did they assume that
lawyers "under an ideal system" would be paid?
The judges then were asked, "Under an ideal' 2 system do you think a
lawyer should be made available to the indigent person in the following
kinds of cases and proceedings?" Responses were:
Sentencing of a defendant who pleaded guilty
Sentencing of a defendant convicted by trial
Habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedy
Hearing on revocation of probation
Sexual psychopath hearing
Misdemeanors
Civil commitment of the mentally ill, including alcoholics
and narcotics addicts
Yes No
18 5
17 8
12 16
6 27
16 5
10 21
Don't No
Know Answer
1 11
0 10
2 5
1 1
0 14
2 2
18 4 0 13
Asked, "Do you think it is unfair to the indigent person if he does not have a
lawyer for such cases and proceedings?"'01 the replies were as follows:
Sentencing of a defendant who pleaded guilty
Sentencing of a defendant convicted by trial
Habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedy
Hearing on revocation of probation
Sexual psychopath hearing
Misdemeanors
Civil commitment of the mentally ill, including alcoholics
and narcotics addicts
es No
.6 8
.6 8
.0 13
4 21
17 3
5 15
Don't No
Know Answer
2 9
2 9
2 10
3 7
1 14
3 12
16 2 1 16
The responses suggest that the judges' thinking about what would be de-
sirable was influenced by current practice. The kinds of cases that won
pluralities of yes votes were those in which lawyers are provided at the
present time; conversely, those with pluralities of no votes were cases in
which attorneys are not appointed.
102. See note 98 supra.
103. The significance of the replies to this question is problematical. At least a few
did not know how to interpret the word "such"; they did not know whether the question
meant "Do you think it is unfair if the indigent person does not have a lawyer for those
cases and proceedings you marked 'yes' in the preceding question?" or whether it meant
"Do you think it is unfair . .. for the following kinds of cases and proceedings?" The
former was the intended meaning. Since, however, many more judges answered this
question (26 in the first horizontal line) than answered yes in the previous one (18 in
the first line), there obviously was confusion. I think the answers are relevant which-
ever meaning the question is given.
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When asked whether appointing lawyers should be compensated for their
services, 26 of the 31 answering said yes, 5 no, one of the latter adding "at
least not in rural counties." All but one judge answered the question whether
appointed counsel should be reimbursed "for their out-of-pocket expenses
for investigation and preparation," and all 34 said yes.
B. Prosecuting Attorney
Eight of Missouri's 115 prosecuting attorneys were interviewed. Mail
questionnaires were sent to the other 107, of whom 68, or 64 percent, replied.
Thus information was received from 76, or 66 percent, of all prosecutors.
Exactiy half of them had five or more years experience as prosecuting or
assistant prosecuting attorneys. All of them are permitted to engage in
private practice, and only nine devoted full time to their official duties. The
remaining 67 answered the question, "How much time do you spend [per
week], on the average, in your capacity as prosecuting attorney?" as follows:
More than 30 hours ............... 17
Between 20 and 29 hours ............ 20
Between 10 and 19 hours ......... 21
Less than 10 hours ..................... 9
Thirty replied no to the question, "Do you feel the funds you have are ade-
quate to run your office?" A number of these specifically mentioned the
court house janitor as a person whose salary exceeded his own. One who
thought his funds adequate under normal circumstances complained that he
was required to try all cases moved out of his county on changes of venue
and that he was not reimbursed for the extra expenses incurred.
Sixty-three of the 76 from whom information was obtained thought that
appointments should be made earlier than they now are. °' Answers to the
question "Do you think it is unfair to the indigent person if he does not get
a lawyer at this stage?" were:
Favoring Present
Earlier Practice
Appointments Satisfactory
Yes 31 9
No 30 2
No answer 2 2
104. See note 98 supra for a discussion of the problems caused by use of the word
"ideal." See note 99 supra and accompanying text for the exact wordings of the ques-
tions.
The vote breakdown was: between arrest and first appearance-19; at first appearance
-22; between first appearance and preliminary hearing-9; at preliminary hearing-3;
before arraignment-lO; present practice satisfactory 13.
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This set of responses might fairly be summarized by saying that among those
in the best position to know, the prosecuting attorneys, 83 percent favored
earlier appointments, half of whom believed that it was unfair to the in-
digent if the appointment was not made at the earlier stage. 5
The prosecutor's answers respecting the kinds of cases and proceedings in
which lawyers should be furnished were:
Sentencing of a defendant who pleaded guilty
Sentencing of a defendant convicted by trial
Habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedy
Hearing on revocation of probation
Sexual psychopath hearing
Misdemeanors
Civil commitment of the mentally ill, including alcoholics
and narcotics addicts
Don't No
Know Answer
0 7
0 9
0 6
0 5
0 11
1 9
52 8 0 16
Responses to the question whether it was unfair if the attorney was not
provided in such"° cases were:
Sentencing of a defendant who pleaded guilty
Sentencing of a defendant convicted by trial
Habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedy
Hearing on revocation of probation
Sexual psychopath hearing
Misdemeanors
Civil commitment of the mentally ill, including alcoholics
and narcotics addicts
Don't No
Know Answer
4 22
5 22
5 29
4 31
4 30
4 26
33 7 5 31
Unlike the judges, the prosecutors did not limit their affirmative votes for
cases in which lawyers are provided under current practice.
Approximately the same proportion (75 percent) of prosecutors as judges
favored compensating the appointed lawyer; 57 were in favor, 15 opposed,
and 4 did not answer. Seventy-one replied to the question whether expenses
of appointed lawyers should be reimbursed; 68 said yes, 3 said no.
C. Defense Attorneys
With a few exceptions for widely-known criminal lawyers, questionnaires
were sent only to attorneys who appeared as counsel in the 422 docket
105. For reasons given in the text earlier, I have not summarized answers to the
question whether such a system could be financed. Those interested can obtain that
information from Table 19.
106. See note 103 supra.
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studies. Hence, most of them went to lawyers practicing in the eight survey
counties. Lawyers who had been retained were eliminated, to the extent
possible, and only those who had been appointed were sampled. The num-
ber of these was still too large, however, and was reduced further by random
selection. Altogether 95 attorneys were sent questionnaires, of whom 57, or
exactly 60 percent, replied. For the reasons stated, however, the responses
were not as representative, statistically or geographically, as those obtained
from judges and prosecutors.
Questions about the present system of defending indigents, and recom-
mended changes, were put to defense lawyers in forms different than those
used with judges and prosecutors:
Please state your opinion about the present system for assignment of
lawyers to represent indigent persons accused of crime.
a. Is the system fair to the indigent person?
b. Is the system fair to the lawyers?
c. What changes, if any, would you recommend? (Circle all numbers
that apply.)
1. Appoint lawyer at earlier stage of case, viz.
"2. Pay out-of-pocket expenses of lawyers incurred in investigation
and preparing case.
3. Pay lawyers for their services.
5. Provide counsel in additional kinds of cases, such as serious
misdemeanors.
6. Improve the system which the judge uses in selecting lawyers
to be appointed (explain below).
7. Other (explain below).
Only one lawyer thought no changes should be made in the present system.
Of the other 56, 38 recommended earlier appointments. Fifteen of these did
not specify at what stage they thought the lawyer should be appointed.
Those who were specific answered as follows: between arrest and first ap-
pearance-12; at first appearance-4; before preliminary hearing--6; at
preliminary hearing-1.
Eleven defense lawyers favored furnishing attorneys in additional kinds of
cases. This total might have been greater had the "such as" been something
other than "serious misdemeanors." This proposal was the least popular of
all those inquired about among the judges and prosecutors. Thirty-seven
approved reimbursing expenses of appointed counsel, and 35 checked the
answer "pay lawyers for their services." Thirty answered no to the question
whether the present system is fair to indigent persons, and 38 said it is unfair
to the lawyers.
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TABLn 19
IDEAL STAGE FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL:
COMPARISON BETWEEN JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS
Senior Junior Public
Senior Junior Prose- Prose- Defen-
Judges Judges cutors cutors ders Total
Total responding 14 21 38 38 2 113
Ideal stage for
apptmt. of atty:
1) Between arrest
and Ist appearance 2 5 8 11 2 28
2) At Ist appearance 4 10 13 9 0 36
3) Before preliminary 2 0 5 4 0 11
4) At preliminary 1 0 3 0 0 4
5) Before arraignment 0 1 5 5 0 11
6) Present practice
satisfactory 4 5 5 8 0 22
7) No answer 1 0 0 0 0 1
Unfair if not apptd.
at that stage?
1) Yes 4 10 18 23 1 56
2) Not necessarily 2 2 8 8 1 21
3) No 4 5 10 5 0 24
4) Don't know 1 2 0 0 0 3
5) No answer 3 2 2 2 0 9
Can system
be financed?
1) Yes 4 12 18 21 1 56
2) No 2 2 11 8 1 24
3) Don't know 4 1 1 1 0 7
4) No answer 4 6 8 8 0 26
Probably the most significant question asked was with respect to the last
case in which the defense attorney had been appointed in 1962. It was,
"Were you appointed in time to represent the accused person adequately?"
Twenty-seven said yes, but 17 said no. (Eight of those responding had not
been appointed in 1962, and therefore were not requested to answer this
question.) That more than 38 percent of the defense lawyers should answer
such a question negatively lends compelling weight to the opinions of judges
and prosecutors that appointments should be made at an earlier stage of the
proceeding.
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D. Comparisons
Judges were divided into two groups for purposes of comparison, those
with 10 or more years service on their present courts, and those with less.
Prosecuting attorneys were also separated into two groups according to
length of service, but the dividing line was five years. Some of the results are
presented in Table 19. Surprisingly, perhaps, there were no meaningful dif-
ferences between prosecutors and judges. The only significant difference be-
tween juniors and seniors appeared to be that the juniors more often thought
a system without earlier appointment was unfair to the indigent."'
There were noteworthy differences between judges and prosecutors, how-
ever, with respect to the kinds of cases in which attorneys should be pro-
vided:
Percentage of total responses
favoring appointment of
attorney: 10 8
Judges Prosecutors
Sentencing of a defendant who pleaded guilty 51 64
Sbntencing of a defendant convicted by trial 49 67
Habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedy 34 53
Hearing on revocation of probation 17 46
Sexual psychopath hearing 45 70
Misdemeanors 29 22
Civil commitment of the mentally ill, etc. 51 69
Only for misdemeanors did a higher percentage of judges than prosecutors
favor appointment. The spectacular disagreement over probation revocation
hearings ought to be cause for concern. One of Missouri's public defenders
commented during an interview, "The prosecuting attorney is always present
at these hearings; why shouldn't the defendant be represented?" Perhaps
notice should also be taken that a majority of prosecutors favored appoint-
ments for post-conviction remedies.
No meaningful differences were detected between the responses of urban
and rural judges and prosecutors. Whatever factors cause varying opinions,
this does not seem to be one of them.
V. COMMENTS
That parts of Missouri's criminal process are not functioning as they
should is obvious. The purpose of this section, however, is not to review
the weak spots but to offer some considerations that are pertinent to deciding
what ought to be done about them.
107. Because of the difference in questions, defense attorneys could not be compared
directly with the judges and prosecutors.
108. "No answer" responses were counted in determining percentages, and they were
numerous. The percentages shown would increase substantially if they were disregarded.
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Initially, of course, a goal must be selected."' With respect to the indigent
person accused of crime, this requires deciding whether to supply him with
all of the protections his more affluent counterpart can buy, or whether to be-
grudge him only those rights the United States Supreme Court has declared
are constitutionally his. It seems to me the proper alternative, ethically,
legally and practically, is the first one. There is no justification for distinc-
tions based on wealth when all the subjects of the criminal process are sucked
into it unwillingly. Arguing that the indigent freely chose to engage in
criminal conduct begs the question by ignoring on the one hand that signifi-
cant numbers are acquitted and on the other that the non-indigent made
the same choice. Furthermore, it is at least arguable that the philosophically
ethical and the pragmatically legal coincide in the Supreme Court's view of
14th Amendment equal protection. 1 ' Determining for any one opinion
what minimum requirements were established and which principles will later
be built upon is a difficult and humbling task. 1' A piecemeal approach runs
two risks-that of being wrong today, and that of being inadequate tomor-
row. It is also a wasteful approach, for it requires either continual revision
of invalidated practices or time-consuming appeals to higher courts, either of
which can be enormously expensive-to society as well as to defendants.
Secondly, it is the reality, not the appearance, of the criminal law that
needs repair. The divergence between the illusion created by statutes and the
reality confronted in jails, offices and courtrooms is so great that some law
school graduates never realize they are supposed to be viewing the same
thing. To deal with substance rather than shadow requires that at least two
subsidiary problems be resolved: (a) How can the goal be defined precisely
109. Theoretically, of course, the first step ought to be defining the frame of reference
within which solutions will be sought. For example, it could be argued that now is an
appropriate time to question the desirability of a system in which the state underwrites
the entire cost of investigation and prosecution, but imposes upon the individual the whole
burden of defending himself, even when the defense is successful. The assumption that
prosecution and defense functions are so incompatible as to require separate organiza-
tional structures might also be challenged. The military services, for example, function
with one group of lawyers who variously and randomly perform the three roles of prose-
cutor, defense attorney and trial judge (law officer) and do so, on the surface at least,
adequately. It seems unlikely, however, that such basic rethinking will occur in Missouri
within the foreseeable future. Therefore I have assumed in the text that the present
system will remain unchanged in these major respects.
110. I have not felt constrained to discuss the holdings and implications of Supreme
Court decisions because that job has been done brilliantly by Professors Kamisar & Choper,
The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations,
48 MINN. L. Rv. 1 (1963).
111. Professors Kamisar and Choper, supra note 110, at 55-61, failed to anticipate
Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964), even though their predilections lay in that
direction.
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and without incorporating invalid assumptions that will emasculate it? and
(b) How is it to be enforced?
Take the "20 hour rule" for example.'12 Its drafters conceivably could
have thought that requiring a warrant to issue within twenty hours of a per-
son's arrest without one would achieve any or all of the following: judicial
scrutiny of the evidence; a limitation on police interrogation; bail being
fixed promptly; the person being promptly informed of his rights, both
constitutional (right to an attorney) and statutory (right to a preliminary
hearing). In practice none of these was achieved at all times in all places,
and some of them were never achieved anywhere. The rule failed partly
because its goals were not defined precisely; they were hidden behind the
warrant issuing process. But a major reason for its failure lies in the statute's
implicit assumptions that certain things automatically follow the issuance of
a warrant. It was assumed, for example, that the rule would get the defen-
dant before a magistrate promptly, and that the magistrate would inform
him of his rights. Neither of these assumptions proved valid.
The assumptions were invalid partly because the rule was not obeyed, and
this points to the other major reason for its failure. Experience with Mis-
souri's discovery rules& 3 indicates that no statute designed for the indigent's
benefit will be fully effective unless it is self-enforcing, that is, unless it is
available without cost and carries mandatory penalties for violation serious
enough to compel obedience. Prosecutors have been permitted not to en-
dorse witnesses, in contravention of the letter of the statute, and to endorse
them too late (in the opinion of defense attorneys) to permit effective
preparation, in contravention of its spirit. No indigent can afford the formal
deposition process and prosecutors have attempted to take advantage of that
fact by telling their witnesses they need not talk to the defense attorney ex-
cept at a deposition. Whether such discovery is or is not desirable is beside
the point. The point is that creating "rules" which are nothing but precatory
admonitions and which are not available to all deepens the cleavage between
the illusion and the reality of the criminal process.
The lesson that goals must be defined precisely, and must not incorporate
assumptions that may or may not be valid, also remains pertinent. Many
lawyers, not only in Missouri, apparently believe that creating public de-
fenders will solve the problems of the indigent defendant. But any perceptive
reader of this report will realize that the only trouble which will automati-
cally be relieved by public defenders is a guilty conscience. For instance, the
problem of the unenthusiastic, inexperienced counsel would not be solved by
legislation establishing pay scales for defenders that do not even attract part-
112. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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time prosecutors, or attract only recent graduates. Two thirds of the persons
contacted during this survey agreed that one of the indigent's critical needs
is the early appearance of his lawyer. This need would not be met, for
example, by legislation establishing one defender in a circuit containing five
counties and requiring him to appear simultaneously at a felony trial in
County A, at initial appearances in Counties B and C, and at preliminary
hearings in Counties D and E.
The difficulty, it seems to me, is that "defending the indigent" is not one
problem at all, as most people seem to think, but a myriad of problems.
Attempting to solve all of them simply by creating a new institution, to be
called a "public defender," is tinkering with the illusion rather than over-
hauling the substance. No public defender is needed to make discovery effec-
tive in Missouri, for example; a change in the rules is needed. By the same
token, discovery will not be effective, irrespective of public defenders, until
the rule is changed to make it enforceable. Whether or not public defenders
should be created is beside the point. The point is that the treatment ac-
corded the indigent is not going to improve until his problems are solved, and
it is absurd to suppose that any one institution will be able to solve them
without statutes that clearly define them, provide for their solutions in terms
that make no unwarranted assumptions about how the criminal process really
works, and incorporate penalty provisons that will make them fully effec-
tive. I suggest, in other words, that the proper method of attack is first to
identify the problems, second to solve by statutory revision those that are
amenable, and then, and only then, to make whatever institutional changes
are necessary to take care of the rest.
With respect to those revisions compelled by Supreme Court decision, the
question of cost is academic. Two things can be said about the cost of the
others. The consequences of refusing, for reasons of economy, to accord an
indigent something that later becomes his constitutional right can be expen-
sive. The avalanche of habeas corpus petitions that inundated Illinois after
the Griffin case 14 and Florida after the Gideon case 5 are cogent proof of
the folly of being penny-wise and pound-foolish. Furthermore, no one can
make even an educated guess about the cost of any program because there
is virtually no information about the criminal process upon which estimates
could be based.
Lack of information, indeed, is one of the major obstacles in the way of
effectively improving the system. Without information, the actual workings
of the process cannot be determined, problems cannot be identified, and
changes cannot be made-except blindly. By actually counting cases, the
114. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
115. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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reporters found that the superficial figures now reported to the Judicial
Conference by some of the survey counties are either incorrect or meaning-
less. It would not be difficult to devise a form upon which meaningful data
about each case could be recorded and reported to the Judicial Conference.
A uniform record system would provide a continuing check on the operations
of the criminal process and would make future revisions both more meaning-
ful and less expensive.
The need for revisions is obvious. Because detailed information is available
for the first time, and because publicity has created a wide public interest,
the time to make them is now. It will be a real tragedy if this opportunity is
wasted by glossing over intricate problems, by making short-sighted improve-
ments that cannot hope to survive a decade, or by failing to provide a
method that will allow continuous surveillance of the process.
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